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The Future of Internet Regulation
PhilipJ. Weiser*
Policymakers are at a precipice with regard to Internet regulation. The
Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") self-styled adjudication
of a complaint that Comcast violated the agency's Internet policy
principles (requiring reasonable network management, among other
things) clarified that the era of the non-regulation of the Internet is over.
Equally clear is that the agency has yet to develop a model of regulation
for a new era. As explained in this Article, the old models of regulation -
reliance on command-and-control regulation or market forces subject only
to antitrust law - are doomed to fail in a dynamic environment where
cooperation is necessary to promote effective competition and continued
Internet connectivity. Thus, this Article calls for a new model of regulation
built around the concept of "co-regulation" - a self-regulatory body
subject to public agency oversight - as the best strategy for Internet
regulation going forward.
This Article outlines a three-part strategy for the FCC, or any other
authorized agency, to oversee Internet connectivity disputes such as those
involving network management practices by broadband providers or
Internet backbone interconnection. First, it calls on the FCC to act as a
norm entrepreneur, identifying areas where cooperation is essential and
setting forth the broad terms that should govern that cooperation. Second,
it explains how the FCC could use a model of co-regulation, with a private
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Dreyfuss, Richard Epstein, Harry First, Ray Gifford, Ellen Goodman, Dale Hatfield,
Tim Holbrook, Michael Katz, Viva Moffat, Paul Ohm, Gideon Parchomovsky, Eric
Posner, Cathy Sharkey, Howard Shelanski, Harry Surden, and Joe Waz as well as
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sector collaborative body operating under its oversight. Third, it
recommends that the FCC should exercise ex post adjudicative authority
(rather than ex ante rulemaking authority), in tandem with the role
played by the private body, to address breakdowns in cooperation and any
departures from announced norms. This model, while of particular
relevance to the future of Internet regulation, can be applied more broadly,
thereby meriting the attention of policymakers and scholars interested in
the future of the administrative state.
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INTRODUCTION
The Internet, which did not fully emerge beyond its roots as an
academic and governmental network until the mid-1990s, developed
outside the ambit of governmental oversight. Indeed, in regulating
telecommunications networks, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") self-consciously adopted a policy of "non-
regulation" toward the Internet during its emergence as an important
commercial network.' This policy, however, is no longer appropriate
for an era in which the Internet delivers information and
communications critical to our social and economic well-being.
Consequently, the era of non-regulation must give way to some form
of government oversight to ensure that impasses resulting from private
actors' disputes do not hamper critical communications.
The stakes of a non-regulation policy for the Internet were
underscored during a week in the fall of 2008 when "major American
and Canadian universities lost contact with each other, officials in
Maine's state government found they could not link up with many
town governments, and [m]illions of Sprint's wireless broadband
customers found themselves cut off from thousands of Web sites."2 If
the affected Internet users contacted their Internet Service Provider
("ISP"), they discovered that the ISP was not the source of the
problem. Rather, the issue stemmed from the lack of an
"interconnection agreement" governing the terms and conditions of
interconnection between Sprint and another Internet "backbone
provider," Cogent. In particular, Sprint rejected Cogent's request to be
treated as a "peer" of Sprint - i.e., Sprint refused to offer Cogent
"settlement-free" interconnection. Instead, Sprint maintained that
Cogent should pay for "transit" services.3
Although Cogent and Sprint settled the dispute after a week, the
Internet outage affected millions of customers and emphasized the
I See generally Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet, (FCC
Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp31.txt (defending unregulation of Internet).
2 Scott Wooley, The Day the Web Went Dead, FORBES, Dec. 2, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2008/12/01/cogent-sprint-regulation-tech-enter-cz-
sw_1202cogent.html.
3 In terms of exchanging traffic between Internet backbone providers, the two
principal alternatives are "peering" - where traffic is handed off between networks
without any charge - and "transit fees" - where the larger network charges the smaller
network for the traffic carried on its network. See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:
Connecting Internet Backbones 7 (FCC Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 32,
2000), available at www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp32.pdf.
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importance of the Internet backbone. In particular, Internet backbone
providers carry traffic from one ISP (such as Comcast's cable modem
service) to another (such as Verizon's DSL service), meaning that
disputes between backbone providers can disrupt Internet service
when their commercial agreements unravel. As the Sprint-Cogent
dispute demonstrated, the lack of any regulatory oversight of the
Internet backbone market leaves the public at the mercy of the
commercial parties, while any dispute between them remains
unsettled.
Once Sprint demanded payment from Cogent for interconnection,
Cogent countered by threatening to end their commercial relationship.
Sprint did not change its position, however, prompting Cogent to
execute its threat. Consequently, millions of Internet users whose ISPs
relied on Cogent to carry their traffic lost the ability to send e-mails to
or access the websites of other Internet users whose ISPs relied on
Sprint and vice versa. In short, private actors not subject to any form
of government oversight compromised a core of the Internet as a
communications network - i.e., the "network effect" created by its
nature as an interconnected network of networks.4 Ultimately, Sprint
and Cogent resolved their dispute with a standstill agreement.
Nonetheless, this dispute did not result in any established process to
govern disputes about whether an Internet backbone provider should
treat another provider as a peer or a paying customer, meaning that
this situation could easily recur (as it had previously between Cogent
and other backbone providers).5 The lack of any assurance that
providers could quickly redress such disputes to protect Internet users
should distress policymakers because the breakdown may well recur
on a larger scale or for a longer period of time. Thus, policymakers
should subject private actors such as Sprint and Cogent to government
oversight to prevent similar situations from recurring.
The Sprint-Cogent dispute is not the only type of breakdown in
Internet connectivity that warrants attention from policymakers.
Another notable event in Internet regulation took place in the fall of
2007. Here, a number of consumers using Comcast's cable modem
4 Economists have termed the value of a larger network as a "network effect." See
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998) (discussing this concept and its legal implications).
' See Mikael Ricknds, Sprint Reconnects Cogent, But Differences Are Unresolved,
NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.networkworld.comnews/2008/110308-
sprint-reconnects-cogent-but-differences.html?fsrc=netflash-rss. See generally Kevin
Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the
Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 UC DAVIs L. REV. 343, 369-72 (2008) (discussing
competitive concerns raised in Internet backbone context).
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service to access the Internet could not use BitTorrent, a popular
"peer-to-peer" ("P2P") application.6 In that case, the ISP (Comcast)
caused the degraded Internet functionality. Comcast claimed this
impact on customers was necessary, however, because it resulted from
its "reasonable network management" policies.7 In particular, such
policies encompassed its efforts to protect the network from harm and
prevent select users from consuming large amounts of bandwidth at
the expense of other customers. At the time of this incident, the FCC
had not announced any formal rules or principles to govern network
management practices, and had merely issued a policy statement
stating that all network management techniques must be reasonable.
Nonetheless, in the face of a complaint that Comcast had violated this
policy, the FCC held a self-styled adjudication and concluded that
Comcast's conduct was unlawful.8
The Sprint-Cogent Internet backbone issue and the Comcast-
BitTorrent network management issue represent emerging regulatory
challenges that do not fit comfortably within the FCC's traditional
models of regulation. The FCC traditionally asks whether private
actors are providing critical infrastructure - one affected with a
"public interest"9 - and, if so, imposes a regime of common carrier
regulation. This tradition is a longstanding one, dating back to the
Interstate Commerce Commission Act and its commitment against
discrimination in rates, terms, and conditions by regulated providers.
Traditionally, the FCC has enforced this commitment through
prescriptive regulation adopted pursuant to "notice-and-comment"
rulemakings.10
To date, the Internet has developed outside of the FCC's traditional
regulatory model, enjoying freedom from regulatory oversight. The
6 A peer-to-peer architecture differs from a "client-server" architecture insofar as
end user computers directly transfer files to one another without the aid of a central
server that communicates directly with "clients" (like a Web browser). BitTorrent is a
particularly popular peer-to-peer application because it efficiently carries large data
files, such as movies and multimedia presentations. Brian M. Posey, Understanding the
Differences Between Client/Server and Peer-to-Peer Networks, TECHREPUBLIC, May 26,
2000, http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-10878_11-1055415.html.
7 Memorandum & Order in the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press &
Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer
Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,028 (2008) [hereinafter Comcast Decision].
8 Id. at 13,028-33.
9 The phrase, which is long associated with utility regulation, dates back to Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
10 Such rulemakings are where the agency issues a notice of proposed rulemaking
and adopts, after receiving comments from a number of parties, rules that restrict the
behavior of the regulated parties.
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Internet initially developed during a long period of U.S. government
stewardship, including substantial financial support and coordination
by key government officials." Owing to a series of formative decisions
in the early 1990s, however, the government privatized the Internet
and it subsequently developed in an environment largely free of
regulation.12 During the onset of the privatization of the Internet in the
mid-1990s, several commentators maintained that regulatory oversight
over the Internet was unwarranted. 13 But over the last several years,
culminating in the FCC's decision in the Comcast-BitTorrent dispute,
it has become clear that the "hands off the Internet" era is over and is
no longer sustainable. The end of this era reflects the fact that many of
society's most treasured forms of information, communications, and
entertainment now travel on Internet networks. Thus, the Internet will
be subject to some form of government oversight to protect the
delivery of information and communications critical to our economy
and society. Scholars and policymakers have yet to develop a
regulatory strategy tailored to this context and different from the
traditional command-and-control regulatory model, which involves
the use of ex ante rules that prescribe how parties can behave.
The reason that episodes like the Sprint-Cogent and Comcast-
BitTorrent disputes are beginning to emerge in a more dramatic
fashion is that a well-functioning Internet ecosystem depends on
cooperation among an array of disparate entities. The absence of that
cooperation, moreover, affects consumers in substantial ways when
there is no system of institutional oversight to ensure that such
cooperation continues. Originally, the Internet's open architecture and
the social norms, which emerged from an era where only a select
group of users set expectations for the Internet's operation, largely
guaranteed such cooperation. 4 Over time, however, commercial
providers entered the market and the demands of users changed,
thereby threatening the established role of the Internet's historically
open protocols and cooperative norms of behavior, as exemplified by
the dispute about network management policies in the Comcast-
BitTorrent dispute. 5 Consequently, a critical question for Internet
stakeholders and consumers is how the commercial providers' terms
11 See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 543-45 (2003) [hereinafter Weiser, Intellectual Property Policy]
(discussing these decisions and Internet's early development).
12 Id.
13 See Oxman, supra note 1, at 25.
'4 See Weiser, Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 11, at 537-38.
1 See Comcast Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,028 (2008).
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of cooperation governing their operation - which broke down in the
Sprint-Cogent and Comcast-BitTorrent cases - will be assured in a
new technological era.
Internet policy debates have yet to catch up with the challenges of
facilitating cooperation in the Internet ecosystem. At present, those
debates often center on calls for or against "network neutrality" and
generally feature different claims about what accounts for the
Internet's success and whether regulating the Internet is prudent.
16
The most ardent supporters of network neutrality call for a model of
regulation that would treat the Internet like an electricity grid, or as a
"dumb pipe." Under this approach, the Internet would not provide
differential quality of service ("QoS") assurances or provide any
functional advantages for particular applications such as Voice over
Internet Protocol ("VoIP"') or BitTorrent. Advocates of this approach
maintain that information infrastructure should be treated as a
"commons" and subject to common carrier regulation just like the
telephone network. 7
Conversely, network neutrality opponents argue that this logic
ignores how the traditional model of common carriage - premised on
prescriptive rules, enforced by filings of tariffs, and often accompanied
by rate regulation - is ill-suited to the Internet's dynamic and more
competitive nature. Notably, while traditional telecommunications
networks generally use static technology where restrictions on change
without regulatory authorization are largely unproblematic, Internet
networks generally operate in a very dynamic technological
environment.
The arguments on both sides of the issue are flawed. As for the
claim of network neutrality supporters that antitrust law can safeguard
cooperation in the Internet ecosystem,18 it overlooks the fact that
generalist courts are limited in their ability to oversee terms of
16 Compare Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate: A User's Guide, 3 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004) (arguing for network neutrality oversight), with Christopher
S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006)
(arguing against it).
17 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 922-23, 925-26 (2005).
18 See, e.g., Jonathan Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An
Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate 2 (Reg-Markets Ctr., Working
Paper 08-07, 2008), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/
page.php?id=1444 (discussing antitrust law's advantages in network neutrality). See
generally PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 90-92 (1997) (criticizing FCC and praising
capabilities of generalist courts).
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cooperation that are highly technical in nature and that have
appropriately been the province of expert agency oversight.19
Moreover, the Internet's dynamism does not justify the claims of
network neutrality opponents that no regulatory oversight is
appropriate. After all, the idea of a private party advancing its own
interests at the risk of halting our society's critical communications is
untenable.
The future of Internet regulation depends on the ability of
policymakers to embrace a new model of regulation that uses very
different tools from the still dominant and traditional model of
command-and-control regulation. 20 To its credit, the FCC has begun
to move partially towards a new model of regulation and has resisted
using the old model in the Internet context thus far. Nonetheless,
neither the FCC nor commentators have developed an institutional
strategy for how the FCC should operate in the Internet ecosystem.
This Article aims to develop such a strategy.
This Article outlines a three-part strategy for the FCC, or any other
authorized agency, to Oversee Internet connectivity disputes. First, the
FCC should act as a norm entrepreneur,2' identifying areas where
cooperation is essential and setting forth the broad terms that should
govern such cooperation. Second, the FCC should use a model of co-
regulation, whereby a private sector collaborative body operates under
FCC oversight. Third, the FCC should exercise ex post adjudicative
authority (rather than ex ante rulemaking authority) to address
breakdowns in cooperation and departures from announced norms.
Notably, although this Article's model of co-regulation focuses on how
the FCC should address Internet policy challenges, policymakers
could also use this model to govern other network industries, such as
electric power transmission. Consequently, this model merits the
19 Moreover, as expressed in the recent Trinko decision, antitrust courts may
refuse to entertain such cases altogether. See Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414-15 (2004).
20 See Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
273, 274-76 (2008) [hereinafter Weiser, Next Frontier]; Philip J. Weiser, Toward a
Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 42-43 (2003) [hereinafter
Weiser, Toward a Next Generation].
21 The term appears to stem from Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2030-31 (1996). For a notable use of the term in
connection with a government agency, see generally Steven Hetcher, The FTC as
Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2044-46 (2000)
(explaining how Federal Trade Commission ["FTC"] supported development and
adoption of privacy policies by Internet companies).
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attention of not only Internet policy scholars and policymakers, but
also of those interested in the future of the administrative state.22
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines why cooperation
among an array of players is both necessary and unlikely to occur
without regulatory oversight. Part I also explains why the traditional
model of regulation is ill-suited to the Internet context. Part II
discusses how the FCC can act as a norm entrepreneur and use a
model of co-regulation to develop and enforce those norms. Part Ill
applies the co-regulation model to network management, discussing
both the implementation challenges and potential objections to that
model. Part IV explains how the FCC should move to the use of ex
post adjudicative authority as a backstop for overseeing breakdowns in
cooperation, and ensure that Internet providers adhere to applicable
norms.
I. COORDINATION, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, AND COMMON CARRIAGE
The challenge for the FCC in the Internet age is to develop an
institutional strategy for addressing policy disputes like the network
management issue in the Comcast-BitTorrent case and the Internet
backbone issue in the Sprint-Cogent dispute. Thus far, these issues
have eluded regulatory scrutiny. For some time, the absence of high
profile breakdowns in cooperation in the Internet environment led the
FCC to adhere to a path of non-regulation. To be sure, the historical
monopoly concerns that gave rise to the traditional use of common
carriage regulation do not justify the imposition of ex ante regulation
of Internet networks. Nonetheless, a different form of market failure
22 For an overall evaluation of the future of the administrative state, see generally
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 136, 138-39 (1990) (noting how parties worked together, with
backdrop of litigation, to institute system of water basin authorities to ensure that
common resource was protected and used appropriately); Jason M. Solomon, Law and
Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 833 (2008) (noting
unaddressed questions of how administrative agencies can, in general, contribute to
collaborative problem-solving and, in particular, how they can "induce the regulated
entities to engage in collaborative efforts"). For recent discussions of the challenges of
the "coordination state" and how government should act in concert with private bodies,
see generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2029, 2030-31 (2005) (discussing how regulatory policy can achieve important goals
outside the use of command-and-control regulation); Robert B. Ahdieh, The New
Regulation: From Command to Coordination in the Modern Administrative State 8
(Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=robert-ahdieh) (same). For an earlier such
effort, see generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 158-62 (1992) (same).
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- high transaction costs and strategic behavior by firms in an
industry where cooperation is necessary to facilitate competition - is
not merely a theoretical problem, but a practical one that the FCC's
traditional regulatory institutions are ill-equipped to handle.
A. The Multiparty Contracting Problem
From both the perspective of the affected companies' long-term best
interests and public policy, the question is not whether there is a need
for a regulatory framework to oversee issues like network management
practices and Internet backbone connection, but rather, what type of
framework can do so most effectively.13 In particular, a central
rationale for developing a regulatory framework to govern such
matters is that it can assure all stakeholders of the ability to employ
business strategies without negotiating a maze of private contracts
with the affected parties. Viewed in this light, one important set of
goals for Internet regulation - whether public or self-regulation - is
to lower transaction costs, provide a principled structure to facilitate
negotiations, and provide some measure of predictability and
reliability as to the rules governing commercial relationships in this
market.24 In short, the regulatory structure advances these goals by
channeling multiparty contracting problems into a framework that
avoids the escalation and politicization of disputes and
misunderstandings.
Without some oversight mechanism to assure all parties the
opportunity to deal fairly with one another and build trust that a
stable equilibrium will continue, the welfare of end users, applications
developers, and broadband service providers remains at risk of being
compromised. In particular, under high levels of uncertainty, a party
may resist investing in certain opportunities or choose to engage in
strategic behavior aimed at appropriating some (or all) of the value
created by another party's investment.2 In short, strategic behavior
23 As explained by Steven Shavell, in cases where parties are unable to anticipate
and, sometimes, incapable of paying for the losses caused by their behavior, the
argument for regulatory oversight - as opposed to merely relying on contract and
tort law - is far more compelling. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus
Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 360-61 (1984).
24 Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General
and With Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 91 (1976) ("[Riegulation may be
described contractually as a highly incomplete form of long-term contracting.").
2 For a poignant example of how the threat by a platform provider to appropriate
the rents of an applications developer can undermine investment incentives, consider
the challenges confronted by Dow Coming after the company invented fiber optic
cable. As two commentators related:
538 [Vol. 43:529
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can potentially leave all parties worse off, undermining the economic
positions of the parties unable to reach an agreement and, in the
process, substantially hurting end users like those left with limited
Internet service in the Sprint-Cogent dispute.
One way to view the challenge of developing norms of cooperation
in the Internet context, whether through regulatory oversight or some
other means, is as a multiparty contracting problem. In short, forging
a level of cooperation between the relevant actors - broadband
providers, applications developers, and end users - requires that they
develop a level of trust and understanding about how the other parties
behave. Ultimately, cooperation between the relevant actors is
essential because the Internet experience arises not from the efforts of
any single actor, but rather through their collective contributions.26
Consequently, the emergence of a cooperative norm to guide behavior
is crucial because the relevant norm, if followed and enforced, can
ensure that parties cooperate even when their narrow self-interest
would otherwise dictate that they strategically withhold cooperation.
Stated differently, if parties recognize a broader interest in
cooperation, or are subject to an enforced norm of cooperation, they
will be more willing to put aside short-term temptations to engage in
strategic behavior that undermines cooperation overall.
The original Internet architecture provided an effective guarantee as
to how parties could and would behave. In its original incarnation, the
Internet operated under a "best efforts" model and Internet
communications were generally not real-time or bandwidth-
intensive.27 Moreover, because no firm owned the core Internet
AT&T, which owned most of the telephone lines in America at the time [of
the invention of fiber optic technology], said it would be 30 years before its
telephone system would be ready for optical fiber. And when it was, AT&T
planned to make its own fiber .... [After AT&T entered into a consent
decree with the federal government allowing competition in long distance,]
MCI took the risk [of ordering fiber optic technology] and placed a 100,000
kilometer order for a new generation of fiber ....
Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From
Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 202 (1997) (quoting
Testimony of Timothy J. Regan, Division Vice President and Director of Public Policy,
Corning, Inc., Before House Judiciary Comm. (May 9, 1995)).
26 See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law,
55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 360 (2007) (noting that all of Internet's value is not created by
nor should be captured by broadband providers).
27 As Lawrence Lessig has put it:
The original Internet achieved this architecture of competition
unintentionally. The framers of the network's original design were not
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standards (i.e., the TCP/IP protocol suite28 ), subjected such standards
to licensing restrictions, or could change them without notice,29 those
standards provided a form of guaranteed open access as long as the
firms universally adopted them. Also, strong social norms that
encouraged cooperation and fair dealing among a relatively small and
sophisticated group of users apart from individual firms, supported
the open architecture.3 ° Consequently, the use of core Internet
standards like the TCP/IP, while voluntary, achieved sufficient
acceptance as to constitute a kind of open contract. To facilitate this
form of cooperation, the Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF") -
a private standard-setting body initially supported by the government
- oversees the development of TCP/IP.3' The IETF also provides a
forum for discussion and famously hews to an Internet ethic of
operating based on "rough consensus and running code."32
In today's highly commercialized Internet environment, a series of
pressures exist that lead broadband providers to upgrade and manage
their networks in ways that compromise the ethic of cooperation that
characterized the traditional Internet environment. Consider, for
example, that broadband providers have a number of rationales for
engaging in network management, ranging from preventing
congestion to identifying viruses and span.33 At the same time,
opportunities exist for applications developers (as well as end users)
economists. They were not focused on building an engine of economic
growth. Yet that was the consequence of a technical design intended to
facilitate development flexibility. A network designed to enable anyone to
develop new applications to run was also a network designed to maximize
competition among applications and content.
The Future of the Internet: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Future of the Internet] (statement of
Lawrence Lessig, Professor, Stanford Law School) (citation omitted), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/LessigTestimony.pdf.
28 The TCP/IP protocol is discussed in Weiser, Intellectual Property Policy, supra
note 11, at 541-44.
29 Oxman, supra note 1, at 5.
30 See Weiser, Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 11, at 537-38.
31 Id.
32 See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical
Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARv. L. REV. 749, 794 (2003) [hereinafter Froomkin,
Critical Theory] (discussing IETF and how it reaches decisions through "rough
consensus"); Andrew L. Russell, 'Rough Consensus and Running Code' and the Internet-
OSI Standards War, IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING, July-Sept. 2006, at
48, 50-52 (discussing history of IETF).
" See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1417, 1466.
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to take advantage of massive levels of bandwidth, sometimes in ways
that challenge the ability of broadband networks to perform reliably.34
Unfortunately, when those efforts - instituting network management
techniques and developing applications that are bandwidth-intensive
or depend on a guaranteed quality of service level - overlap, the
relevant commercial actors (i.e., the broadband providers and
applications developers) may seek to take advantage of one another's
investments rather than cooperate. When such actors seek to take
advantage of one another's investments, their actions can lead to a
game of brinkmanship, with end users potentially suffering as
innocent victims.
In evaluating the potential for breakdowns in cooperation, it is
important to note at the outset that, contrary to some of the depictions
of network neutrality advocates, broadband platform providers would
not benefit generally from undermining the success of the applications
that ride on their platforms. Indeed, under many circumstances, the
economic incentives of a platform provider are to encourage and
embrace the development of new applications that will make its
platform more valuable.35 To that end, for example, Comcast CEO
Brian Roberts reported that "the increased demand for online video
viewing was helping drive sales of cable modems," and stated that
" '[v]ideo over the Internet is cable's friend[.]' "36
From the perspective of aspiring applications developers such as
BitTorrent, the decision to trust a platform provider like Comcast is
open to a number of questions. Even setting aside the concern that a
platform provider will act in ways to prevent the applications
developer from competing with the platform,37 applications developers
" See Stacey Higginbotham, Why We Need Fat Pipes: The Top 5 Bandwidth-Hungry
Apps, GIGAOM, Aug. 12, 2008, http://gigaom.com/2008/08/12/why-we-need-fat-pipes-
the-top-5-bandwidth-hungry-apps (discussing emerging bandwidth-intensive
applications).
" See generally Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration,
and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 97-104 (2003) (describing economic logic
behind principle that platform provider welcomes complementary applications).
36 Vishesh Kumar, Comcast Reports Strong Results in Web Services, WALL ST. J., July
31, 2008, at B8.
37 One such case involved the blocking of Vonage's VoIP service by Madison River
Communications. See Consent Decree in the Matter of Madison River Commc'ns, LLC
& Affiliated Cos., 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4296 (2005) [hereinafter Madison River],
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf.
There have been some examples abroad as well. See, e.g., Cho Jin-seo, Cable TV
Operators Block HanaTV, KoREA TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/
article.asp?parentid=55961 (reporting that home Internet and cable television
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will often worry about the temptation of platform providers to extract
rents once the application has been developed and successfully
deployed.38 Indeed, if that fear is great enough, applications developers
may decline to develop new applications or engage in wasteful cat-
and-mouse strategies aimed at evading detection by the rent seeker.
39
On the other side of the equation, platform providers will suffer if
applications developers use their bandwidth and offer QoS-hungry
applications, but cannot be charged for guaranteeing a level of
network performance. 4 In short, prohibitions on network operations
could potentially interfere with platform providers' pursuit of
legitimate business opportunities and bona fide efforts to enhance the
performance of their networks (as opposed to degrading the
performance of applications for anticompetitive purposes).
Hardcore free-marketers may suggest that the market can be trusted
to develop institutional arrangements to anticipate and address the
possibility of strategic behavior and to encourage ongoing innovation
by both platform providers and applications developers. To be sure,
firms may well be able to, under certain conditions, anticipate and
address concerns related to "ex post opportunism."41 Similarly, in
some environments, such as the earlier era of the Internet, social
norms develop and private actors effectively enforce them without
government oversight. The ability of private actors to protect
themselves, however, breaks down when they confront high levels of
uncertainty as to the continuing force of those norms, and high
transaction costs as to the ability to develop ongoing contractual
protections. As noted commentator James DeLong has explained,
"[Tihe mantra of 'do it by contract' is [flawed insofar as] it requires
operators blocked Internet television services). For a discussion of the possible
reasons for such behavior, see Farrell & Weiser, supra note 35, at 105-19.
38 For a discussion of the concerns related to rent-extraction, see C. Scott
Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 YALEJ.
ON REG. 135, 149-50 (2008).
39 As Gawer and Henderson note, if the platform provider's "incentive to engage in
ex post price 'squeezes' is sufficiently strong, complementors may have no ex ante
incentive to engage in innovation at all." Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson,
Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 5 (2007).
40 For a development of this point, see Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz,
The Economics of Product-Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network Neutrality
Debate 1-2 (UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center, Working Paper, 2006), available
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC06-059.
"1 Joshua D. Wright, Benjamin Klein's Contributions to Law and Economics 10
(George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-31, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1 143568.
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contract writers with an unlimited legal budget and a level of foresight
that would be the envy of a psychic. '4 2 Moreover, at least in this
context, "[WIe are talking long term investments under conditions of
great uncertainty, and it is difficult to write the contracts that would
be required."43 Consequently, if protections against opportunistic
behavior (either contractual or norm-based safeguards) do not emerge,
the "fear of opportunism can dull the incentives of other parties -
downstream firms, [applications developers], rival networks, or final
customers - to make investments."44
The concern regarding opportunistic behavior is greatest where a set
of parties needs to cooperate with one another to produce a service
(e.g., Internet backbone interconnection) and where one party can
threaten not to cooperate as a means of extracting greater rents from
the other party.4" In general, firms confronting such a scenario will try
to avoid engaging in repeated bargaining for fear that their ability to
bargain effectively will be compromised once they have made
relationship-specific investments.46 The study of such relationships
and the effort to develop safeguards against ex post opportunism is a
central project of new institutional economics ("NIE"). Thus, as NIE
explains, firms search for contractual (or regulatory) guarantees
against opportunistic behavior when entering into such
relationships.47 In some cases, reputational constraints and the power
42 James V. DeLong, Avoiding a Tech Train Wreck, AMERICAN, May-June 2008,
available at http://www.american. comlarchive/2008/may-june-magazine-contents/
avoiding-a-tech-train-wreck; see also Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics,
Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 102 (2002) (noting that
"[tiransacting parties enter into relationships to mitigate lex post opportunistic
behavior] but cannot do so perfectly").
43 DeLong, supra note 42.
44 Carl Shapiro, Professor, UC Berkeley, Testimony on Exclusionary Conduct,
Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n 16 (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/amcexclusion.pdf.
4" Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments:
Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168, 169 (1987).
46 Id.
4 As Paul Joskow explained:
According to [NIE], when exchange involves significant investments in
relationship-specific capital, an exchange relationship that relies on repeated
bargaining is unattractive. Once the investments are sunk in anticipation of
performance, "hold up" or "opportunism" incentives are created ex post
which, if mechanisms cannot be designed to mitigate the parties' ability to
act on these incentives, could make a socially cost-minimizing transaction
privately unattractive at the contract execution stage. A long-term contract
that specifies the terms and conditions for some set of future transactions ex
ante, provides a vehicle for guarding against ex post performance problems.
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of social norms may be effective; in others, vertical integration may
become a necessary step to mitigate against the hazards of ex post
opportunism; and, in still other cases, parties may remain vulnerable
to the possibility of hold-up, relying on imperfect contractual
strategies as their best mode of protection.48 And in yet other cases,
such as the network management issue, some form of regulation may
be necessary to enable these markets to function reliably and
effectively. 9
Given the challenges of developing private protections against
opportunistic behavior,5" it should not be surprising that, over the
course of modern regulatory history, platform providers and
Id. (citations omitted).
48 As Joshua D. Wright has explained, reputational sanctions and contractual
flexibility sometimes go hand-in-hand, but they do not prevent the possibility that
"transactors 'hold up' their trading partners by taking advantage of unspecified
elements of performance and attempting to appropriate the available quasi-rents
resulting from relationship-specific investment." Wright, supra note 41, at 10.
49 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 268 (1996)
(" [R]egulation can serve to infuse trading confidence into otherwise problematic trading
relations."). In game theory terms, the issue can be described as whether the scenario
poses a "prisoner's dilemma" problem, where the threat of strategic behavior (and
defection) cannot be overcome, or a Herder Problem, where repeat players are interested
in and open to cooperation if the appropriate institutional framework can make that
possible. See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Institutions Matter!: Why the Herder
Problem Is Not a Prisoner's Dilemma, THEORY & DECISION, Oct. 30, 2008, at 7-8,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/j67083230788g657ip=dc42deed9cc84fcfad54e76
95d2bae24&pi=O0; see also OSTROM, supra note 22, at 15-17 (explaining opportunity for
cooperative behavior to emerge). Suggesting a similar concept, Amartya Sen once labeled
this issue the "assurance problem," suggesting that where an institution can provide
firms assurance that others are doing the "right thing" - e.g., respecting a cooperative
norm - "then it is in one's own interest also to do the 'right' thing." See Amartya K. Sen,
Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 122 (1967).
50 A particular challenge is ensuring a credible commitment that other parties will
adhere to the relevant norm. As Dan Kahan has explained, an institution can succeed
in channeling disputes and maintaining adherence to social norms if it is regarded as
effective:
[If firms or individuals] perceive that others are contributing to the
collective good in question, then honor, self-respect, honesty, and like
dispositions motivate most individuals to contribute to that good as well,
even if doing so is personally costly. If, in contrast, they perceive that most
individuals are free riding, then pride and resentment will move most
persons to withhold contributions - and even to retaliate, if they can,
against perceived shirkers - notwithstanding significant material incentives
to do otherwise.
Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1513, 1514 (2002).
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applications developers have often relied on the presence of regulatory
oversight mechanisms to facilitate cooperation." Consider, for
example, the role played by the rules governing "retransmission
consent" arrangements in the cable television context.5 2 These rules
effectively seek to limit the potential for a firm to engage in strategic
behavior - either the platform provider (in this case, the cable or
satellite company) or the applications developer (in this case, the
broadcast network owning local television stations). The presence of
such rules becomes part of the operating environment and is only
visible on rare occasions, such as the high-profile dispute between
Time Warner and Disney that resulted from an impasse in carriage
negotiations between Disney's set of channels (including ABC, Disney,
and ESPN) and Time Warner's cable systems.53 In particular, Time
Warner refused to meet Disney's demands and eventually ceased
carrying all of its channels. This left Time Warner's customers without
access to popular shows, including the then very popular "Who Wants
to Be a Millionaire," which ABC carried. In this case, the FCC
possessed the necessary regulatory oversight authority to act quickly
and condemn Time Warner's conduct, thereby ensuring that Time
Warner resumed carrying Disney's channels.54 In announcing the
ruling, then-FCC Chairman Bill Kennard warned that "no company
should use consumers as pawns in a private contract dispute, 55 and
criticized the parties for their "game of brinkmanship."56
In an unregulated environment, such as the Internet backbone,
concerns related to hold out tactics can arise when firms do not
respect the prevailing norms of how to exchange traffic. Notably, the
Sprint-Cogent episode discussed in the Introduction is hardly an
5" Given the transaction costs in developing cooperative norms, one important
role that the law can play is to provide a focal point for facilitating cooperation. See,
e.g., Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1651 (2000) ("When individuals have a common interest in coordinating, as
frequently occurs, a legal rule may guide behavior merely by influencing expectations
about how others will behave.").
52 For a discussion of these rules, see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J.
WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 359,363-66 (2005).
53 Id. at 365.
51 See Time Warner Cable, Emergency Petition of ABC, Inc. for Declaratory Ruling
and Enforcement Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 7882, 7882-84 (2000).
" Press Release, William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, Ruling in Time Warner-
Disney Dispute (May 3, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
Statements/2000/stwek036.html.
51 Press Release, William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, Regarding Disney/ABC and
Time Warner Dispute (May 2, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
Kennard/Statements/2000/stwek035.html,
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isolated case. Over the last few years, Cogent has challenged the
relevant norms (informal and uncodified as they are) on a number of
occasions. As in the case with Sprint, when Cogent has played a game
of chicken with other backbone operators as a negotiating tactic, it has
sometimes left Internet users (both those connected to Cogent and
those using the other affected networks) with degraded service as a
result.57 At present, however, there is no regulatory oversight, either
private or public, to govern such negotiations, leaving users
unprotected from the collateral damage that arises when parties
engage in strategic and self-interested behavior.
In principle, private parties in the Internet ecosystem could agree on
cooperative norms - whether on Internet backbone interconnection,
network management, or other Internet policy issues - without any
governmental involvement. Thus far, however, they have failed to do
so. Moreover, the temptations for strategic behavior and the attendant
transaction costs of developing and enforcing those norms constitute
formidable hurdles. Thus, the contractual environment, the relevant
norms, and the regulatory requirements in the Internet ecosystem are
all in flux, meaning that businesses and policymakers need to develop
a strategy for guarding against opportunism.
Despite the fact that in many contexts parties would be better off if
they cooperated, the lure of opportunistic behavior is often too strong
to curtail without public oversight. Consider Professor Gary Libecap's
finding that, when neighboring property owners are interested in
drilling for oil, they rarely cooperate to develop a framework that
leaves them all better off. Rather, at least as a historical matter, each
neighbor tends to act opportunistically, drilling down to reach the
same bed of oil and, in the process, all end up worse off.5 8 Conversely,
where parties do cooperate with one another, they are often able to do
57 See, e.g., Alex Goldman, The Cogent-Level 3 Dispute, ISP-PLANET, Oct. 7, 2005,
http://www.isp-planet.com/business/2005/cogentjlevel3.html; Om Malik, Cogent,
Sprint Un-peer, May Cause Web Slowdown, GIGAOM, Oct. 31, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/external/gigaom/2008/10/31/31gigaom-cogent-sprint-un-
peer-may-cause-web-slowdown-27495.html; Mikael Ricknas, Sprint-Cogent Dispute
Puts Small Rip in Fabric of Internet, PC WORLD, Oct. 31, 2008,
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/153123/sprintcogent-dispute-puts-s
mall-rip-in-fabric of intemet.html; Todd Underwood, Wrestling with the Zombie:
Sprint Depeers Cogent, Internet Partitioned, RENESYS BLOG, Oct. 31, 2008,
http://www.renesys.com/blog/2008/10/wrestling-with-the-zombie-spri.shtml.
58 James Surowiecki, The Permission Problem, NEw YORKER, Aug. 11, 2008,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/08/11/08081 ita-talk_
surowiecki.
[Vol. 43:529
The Future of Internet Regulation
so because they operate within close-knit communities where, among
other things, reputational sanctions are effective.59
Outside of close-knit communities, parties are generally able to
cooperate with one another when an established institution that
facilitates communication and cooperation exists. In some cases, such
institutions have a quasi-public character to them.6 ° In others, private
companies, such as the different companies who owned the patents
necessary to manufacture DVDs,6 1 are able to forge a coalition to
establish a framework that restricts the opportunities for hold-up
behavior. Such scenarios, however, tend to emerge only when an
industry leader exists or where the parties are not focused on (or even
aware of) the potential market opportunities in this area. In such
cases, the lure of opportunistic behavior is less appealing, and thus
easier to overcome.62 Moreover, private parties may encounter
difficulty in reaching such solutions when the parties are both
competitors and complementors, as is often the case in the Internet
59 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
167 (1991) ("[M]embers of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose
content serve to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their
workaday affairs with one another." (footnote omitted)); see also Barak D. Richman,
Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private
Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2363 (2004) (explaining that "free entry" is
"antithetical to the realities of private ordering systems").
6 One notable historical example was the creation of merchant guilds. See Avner
Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant
Guild, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27, 35 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1998)
("The core of the merchant guild was an administrative body that supervised the
overseas operations of merchant residents of a specific territorial area and held certain
regulatory powers within that territorial area."). In that case, reputational sanctions
failed and were replaced by this institution because they were undermined by contract
ambiguities and asymmetric information, as well as selective discrimination. Id.
61 For the antitrust business review letter approving the creation of this patent
pool, see Letter from Joel J. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust Div., to Garrard R. Beeney, Attorney on Behalf of Koninklijke Philips Elecs.,
N.V., Sony Corp. of Japan & Pioneer Elec. Corp. of Japan, Sullivan & Cromwell 15
(Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm.
62 In the network management context, for example, the establishment of an
oversight regime would deal a blow to the respective unrealistic fantasies of both the
broadband providers and applications developers. For the applications developers,
there is a temptation to view the provision of bandwidth as endless, very cheap (or
free), not their problem, and as a cost and responsibility that can be dumped on the
broadband provider. For the broadband providers, there is a temptation to view the
profits generated by the applications providers (or at least a piece of them) as properly
theirs (although the risks, on this view, are not shared). In reality, both broadband
providers and applications developers need to find a strategy for coordinating their
behavior, working out differences of opinions, avoiding opportunistic behavior, and
preventing misunderstandings from escalating.
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ecosystem. But it is also true, as discussed in the next subpart, that the
solutions of the twentieth century - a reliance on common carrier
regulation or antitrust oversight - are unlikely to provide a successful
strategy for facilitating effective cooperation in the Internet ecosystem
by themselves.
B. The Limits of Common Carrier Regulation and Antitrust
The traditional regulatory model for telecommunications networks
emerged in response to the Bell System's discrimination in
interconnection, including the withholding of cooperation from
certain users, as an anticompetitive tool in the late 1800s and early
1900s. In particular, such behavior ultimately led Congress to adopt
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), which
imposed common carrier regulation on all providers.63 The 1934 Act
clarified that the telecommunications industry was a network industry
requiring cooperation in interconnection, and thus regulators could
not treat it just like any other market. Notably, the 1934 Act
underscored the conclusion that the government could not trust that
telecommunications markets would produce competitive markets or
provide access to networks without public regulatory oversight. 4
The 1934 Act's antidiscrimination rule drew its language directly
from the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, which responded to
the competitive concerns raised by the rise of the railroads.6" The
antidiscrimination rule, enforced by preset and tariffed rates, terms,
and conditions, emerged largely from the concern that firms would
withhold cooperation as a means of extracting a rent from the other
party. Farmers worried, for example, about the rates railroads would
charge, and the common carrier regulatory solution offered a measure
of stability and regularity. 66 Similarly, for the railroad companies
63 See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 201, 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 (1934)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (2006)).
4 As Richard A. Epstein put it, "[T]he provision of telecommunications services is
not like the production and sale of raisins. Even if pure competitive markets are
possible in agriculture, they are not possible in telecommunications, notwithstanding
the hype in support of this assertion." Richard A. Epstein, The AT&T Consent Decree:
In Praise of Interconnection Only, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 149, 153 (2008).
65 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1331-32 (1998).
66 See DeLong, supra note 42 (noting fears of farmers that railroads would charge
price just high enough so that farmers would earn "a return that paid only marginal
costs, forcing it to forgo much if any return on capital").
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themselves, the regulatory solution provided a measure of stability
that emerged from prices set by regulators.67
During the rise of the Internet, one question hanging over
policymakers was whether to apply the traditional common carrier
model to the Internet. Notably, the network neutrality debate echoed
some of the earlier debates insofar as it also implicated the question of
rent extraction. 68 In particular, many proponents of network neutrality
championed a zero price, nondiscriminatory access rule on the ground
that it would protect developers of applications (such as Google and
Yahoo) that require access to broadband platforms.69 The theory
behind this rule, which bears some resemblance to the traditional
common carrier requirement, is to treat all traffic equally, thereby
enabling applications developers to "innovate without permission."
70
Critics of a common carrier-like network neutrality rule highlight
the point that limits on broadband providers' pricing strategies will
invariably restrict their ability to recover their sunk costs, and thus
undermine their incentives to invest in the network.71  Stated
differently, such critics suggest that any prescriptive rule runs the risk
of being overbroad and discouraging investment and innovation in the
network. At this point, neither party has clearly prevailed in the policy
arena. In the absence of any established rule, it is likely that all
affected parties will be tempted to engage in rent-seeking behavior -
whether in terms of strategic behavior in the marketplace or efforts to
obtain favorable regulatory treatment - and continue pressing for a
resolution that favors their interests.
67 See generally id. (discussing issues that emerged from that era).
To that end, some predict a similar result in the Internet context as took place
in the railroad context. See Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality,
and the Never-Ending Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets 12 (Digital
Tech. Ctr., Univ. of Minn., Working Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1095350 (predicting, in Internet context, that "some
form of government intervention, to set the rules, is inevitable" and "may be
welcomed by the players, just as government intervention was welcomed in the end by
the railroads").
69 See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 873,
887 (2009) ("[Cloncerns about private discrimination may have once again mounted
towards the heights that drove this country to adopt the original paradigm of
regulation in the telecommunications field: administrative oversight of an industry
providing common carrier services."); see also Hemphill, supra note 38, at 149.
70 See Posting of Tim Berners-Lee to DIG, http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/
node/132 (May 2, 2006, 15:22 EST) (explaining that "lalnyone can build a new
application on the Web, without asking me, or Vint Cerf [co-creator of the Internet
Protocol], or their ISP, or their cable company, or their operating system provider, or
their government, or their hardware vendor").
71 See Hemphill, supra note 38, at 149.
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The part of the network neutrality debate that has yet to generate
much discussion is which institutional strategy policymakers should
embrace for a broadband era. As incidents like the Comcast-
BitTorrent and Sprint-Cogent disputes illustrate, broadband networks
constitute the type of critical infrastructure that gave rise to the
development of common carrier regulation in the early part of the
twentieth century. This does not mean that common carrier regulation
is necessarily warranted, but it does beg the question of what model of
regulation is appropriate for the Internet era. 72 The application of
common carrier regulation to the Internet faces three formidable
criticisms: (1) concerns that the model is overly rigid and ill-suited to
a more dynamic technological environment;73 (2) unlike the era of the
Bell System, there are now two rival networks (cable and telephone
networks) that provide some measure of competitive balance vis-A-vis
one another; and (3) FCC administration of command-and-control
regulation invites and rewards rent-seeking behavior.74 In any event,
whether the FCC or another regulatory agency imposes traditional
common carrier regulation on Internet networks, the FCC's decision
in the Comcast-BitTorrent dispute - which adjudicated and
developed a principle rather than enforced a pre-existing requirement
- suggests both that some form of regulatory oversight is likely to
emerge and that the ultimate form of oversight is yet to be determined.
For emerging competition policy issues, some suggest that Congress
either should craft a new policy solution or that policymakers should
rely on the general applicability of the antitrust laws.75 Applying such
72 See Crawford, Transporting Communications, supra note 69, at 873 (noting
challenge of developing "a model of regulation that maintains the essential nugget of
basic, common carriage non-discrimination regulation without resurrecting the
superstructure of heavy-handed rate-based government micromanagement that both
regulator and regulated were happy to dismantle"); Epstein, supra note 64, at 161
("The first point to recognize here is that once we leave the AT&T monopoly model,
some form of regulation will prove necessary to deal with the question of
interconnections between the parties.").
73 See IP-Enabled Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4864-
68 (2004) ("[Cihanges wrought by the rise of [Internet Protocol)-enabled
communications promise to be revolutionary," a source of technological dynamism,
and a driver of innovation); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446 (2003) (stating that command-and-control
regulation, "especially when centralized through federal regulation, suffers from the
inherent problems involved in attempting to dictate the conduct of millions of actors
in a quickly changing and very complex economy and society throughout a large and
diverse nation").
7' For a classic discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Richard A. Posner,
Taxation by Regulation, 3 BELLJ. ECON. 22 (1971).
75 See Nuechterlein, supra note 18, at 2; Thomas Hazlett, FCC Should Leave Net
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advice to resolve questions, like what constitutes reasonable network
management and other technical Internet policy issues, is highly
questionable. For Congress, the challenge is whether it can legislate in
a complex and dynamic area where the relevant concerns are "best
confronted with a scalpel, not a sledgehammer."76 As for the role of
antitrust law, there are substantial questions about its effectiveness in
the context of resolving Internet policy disputes. Commissioner
Thomas Rosch of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has
suggested, for example, an antitrust court might well have not
condemned the blocking of a rival application (as the FCC did in the
Madison River Communications case).77 Moreover, on the remedy front,
as then-FTC Commissioner (and current Chairman) Jonathan
Leibowitz has explained, antitrust institutions may well be ill-
equipped to oversee more technical matters like interoperability and
network management.78 Finally, it remains to be seen whether
antitrust oversight even applies in broadband markets.79 In short, these
limitations all point to the need to develop a new model of regulation
for Internet policy, which is the subject of Part II.
Neutrality to Anti-Trust Courts, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/bac78ca4-8ee8-1ldd-946c-0000779fd18c.html.
76 See Weiser, Next Frontier, supra note 20, at 5.
77 See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, FTC, Address at the Broadband Policy Summit
IV: Broadband Access Policy: The Role of Antitrust 6-7 (June 13, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080613broadbandaccess.pdf. Of course, the FCC
concluded that such behavior violates the Communications Act. See Madison River, 20
F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297 (2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf.
78 Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FCC, Concurring Statement Regarding the Staff Report:
"Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy" 1 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf ("[Wihile antitrust may be a good way of
thinking about [consumers' 'Internet Freedoms'], it is not necessarily well-suited to
protecting them."); see also Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from
AT&T, Microsoft, and Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST LJ. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2,
on file with author).
w See Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 399, 412 (2004); see also ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22, 340, 360 (2007),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amcfinal_
report.pdf (deeming Trinko merely refusal-to-deal case that "does not displace the role
of antitrust laws in regulated industries"); Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of
Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549, 550 (2005)
(evaluating impact of regulation on role of antitrust in wake of Trinko).
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II. A MODEL OF CO-REGULATION FOR INTERNET POLICY
The legacy of the FCC is one of command-and-control regulation,
with an attendant propensity to invite rent-seeking behavior. 80 By
contrast, the Internet's culture is premised on cooperation,
collaboration, and free-wheeling entrepreneurship. Thus, a principal
challenge for the FCC in the twenty-first century - if not the
principal challenge for the agency - is to forge a new model of
regulation that can reign in the Internet's aspiration to exist as a law-
free zone without using the agency's legacy modus operandi. To that
end, the model of co-regulation - where a public regulatory body
oversees a self-regulatory organization ("SRO") - shows considerable
promise as a means of developing standards of conduct necessary to
implement basic norms and enforcing compliance with those norms.
To make the case for co-regulation, this Part first explains how the
FCC has used self-regulatory strategies in the past, then discusses how
the FTC has done so, and finally outlines how the FCC could
effectively use such a model in the Internet context.
A. The FCC and Self-Regulation
Traditional administrative law accounts have yet to incorporate and
explain the potential for co-regulation as a regulatory strategy.8' This
strategy, however, is starting to attract attention in selected areas
outside securities law,82 where, as experience has shown, the presence
or absence of public monitoring is critical to the success of self-
regulatory initiatives.83 Part of the challenge for policymakers and
8 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke:" An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 335, 399-400 (2001) (criticizing
FCC).
81 Notably, in a discussion of the institutional strategies that agencies can use to
address policy issues - itself, an under-examined area in administrative law -
Professor Magill declined to include a role for self-regulation as a tool available to
regulators. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1383, 1386 (2004); see also Solomon, supra note 22, at 836-37 (noting how
new governance scholars have generally not studied self-regulatory models).
82 Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 320-21 (2005) (discussing self-regulation in
employment law context and concluding that "coordination of internal or self-
regulatory compliance structures with the external law of the workplace has the
potential to create new mechanisms for enforcement of employee rights and labor
standards").
83 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity
Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 323 (2007) ("When the power of self-
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commentators is that the related concept of self-regulation is
susceptible to a number of interpretations.8 4 As used in this Article,
the concept of co-regulation involves industry self-policing through an
independent and credible body subject to government accountability
and oversight.8
For an example of co-regulation, consider the Better Business
Bureau's National Advertising Division ("NAD"). In short, the NAD
serves as a self-policing mechanism for deciding false advertising
claims. In so doing, it operates under the FTC's informal oversight, as
the FTC is able to hear cases after the NAD renders a decision in a
particular case.86 In this model, the SRO wields actual decision-making
authority (as opposed to merely offering advice) and is accountable to
a government agency (leading some to call this approach "audited self-
regulation"). 8 After discussing how the FCC and the FTC have used
self-regulation in the past, this Part discusses how the FCC could use
co-regulation in the context of network management and other
Internet policy issues.
In his dissent in the Comcast decision, FCC Commissioner Robert
McDowell called for an approach based on collaboration and not
regulation. 8 In particular, McDowell pointed to existing Internet
interest is harnessed to achieve common benefits, self-regulation (with the
Commission's well-oiled shotgun behind the door) can be a very effective and
affordable means of regulating the securities markets."); Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04
Rule Let Banks Pile up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com2008/10/03/business/03sec.html?_r= 1.
84 See Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation,
29 OTTAWA L. REV. 233, 238-39 (1997) (setting forth five versions of self-regulation).
85 This definition is consistent with the one used by Ofcom. See OFCOM,
IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: PRINCIPLES FOR ANALYSING SELF- AND
Co-REGULATION § 2.14 (2008), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/
coregulation/statement/statement.pdf; OFCOM, INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF WHEN TO ADOPT
SELF- OR CO-REGULATION § 2.17 (2008), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/
condocs/coregulation/condoc.pdf.
86 See Jeffrey S. Edelstein, Self-Regulation of Advertising: An Alternative to Litigation
and Government Action, 43 IDEA 509, 527 (2003) (explaining regime and noting that
only 5% of cases are referred to FTC and other government agencies); see also Andrew
Strenio et al., Self-Regulatory Techniques for Threading the Antitrust Needle, 18-SUM
ANTITRUST 57, 57 (calling NAD "notable example of successful self-regulation").
87 See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 174-77 (1995). Ayres and Braithwaite call
a version of this concept "enforced self-regulation." See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 22, at 101-02 (applying concept at individual firm, rather than at industry, level).
I Formal Complaint of Free Press and Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,088-94
(2008) [hereinafter McDowell Dissent]. Commissioner Adelstein suggested a similar
preference in his statement:
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standard-setting bodies as the obvious starting place for a self-
regulatory program.89  This confidence, unfortunately, is likely
misplaced, as it assumes a type of institutional competence that these
existing bodies generally lack.9 ° These existing bodies lack the ability
to set and enforce standards of conduct because they are consensus-
based organizations and not in the habit of determining compliance
with pre-established principles. 9' McDowell suggests, moreover, that
"[these [bodies] have remained largely self-governing, self-funded
and non-profit - with volunteers acting in their own capacities and
not on behalf of their employers. ''9 2 This depiction is also overly
optimistic. Notably, corporate interests affect participants in these
bodies, creating difficulty in reaching closure on contentious issues.
The IETF, for example, wrestled for years on the appropriate means of
ensuring interoperability between instant messaging services and
never effectively resolved the issue due to conflicting corporate
interests.
93
As providers craft their network management practices, the Order sends a
strong signal about the importance of engaging industry standard-setting
bodies, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet
Architecture Board, and the Internet Society, which offer the best forum for
resolving network management issues. It is certainly preferable for facilities-
based providers and applications providers to work collaboratively, in an
open and transparent manner, without the need for government
intervention. To the extent that engineers can work out these issues among
themselves, it obviates the need for Commission action.
Comcast Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,081-82 (2008) (statement of Commissioner
Adelstein).
9 McDowell Dissent, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13,093.
90 Philip J. Weiser, Exploring Self Regulatory Strategies for Network Management 20
(Flatirons Summit on Information Policy, Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.
silicon-flatirons.org/documents/publications/summits/WeiserNetworkManagement.pdf.
[hereinafter Weiser, Network Management] (discussing limits of IETF as potential
adjudicative body).
91 See id.
92 McDowell Dissent, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13,093.
93 As explained elsewhere:
In 1995, before the Internet became big business, private standard-setting
bodies like the IETF could focus on the technical merits of proposed
standards without the distorting influence of private companies that would
benefit depending on the ultimate outcome. As the stakeholders in the
future of the Internet become more diverse and more concerned with the
impact of the Internet's development on their profits, stable, open, and end-
to-end-based standards may well become the exception, not the norm. Take
the case of instant messaging, for example. Instant Messaging, or IM, relies
on the Internet transport protocols and adds a Names and Presence
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If the FCC opts for a model of co-regulation to resolve Internet
policy disputes, turning to existing standard-setting bodies for
guidance may not be feasible. Instead, the agency may need to oversee
the establishment of a new SRO, as discussed below. To that end, the
few existing self-regulatory initiatives that the FCC has overseen
warrant examination. To be sure, these programs admittedly involve
much smaller-scale activity than network management policies or
Internet backbone interconnection, but they still provide valuable
insight as to what type of institutional solution can be effective in the
Internet context.
One notable self-regulatory program that the FCC has overseen is
the use of frequency coordinators, which manage voluntary
cooperation in the use of point-to-point microwave links and private
land mobile radio systems.94 In that context, the coordinator evaluates
requests for new licenses and certifies that such new licenses will not
cause undue interference to established users.95 Consequently, while
the FCC is the authority that grants or denies licenses as a formal
matter, it routinely relies on and defers to the judgment of the
frequency coordinator.96 This deference to the frequency coordinator
facilitates cooperation around the use of the relevant licenses. Dale
Hatfield, a former Chief Engineer at the FCC, explained that a key
reason why this system works so well is that it invites the engineers to
"sit down together, solve these problems, and say let's figure out how
to do it.
'97
In the radio frequency coordination context, the FCC calls upon the
coordinator to avoid interference between competing users, leaving
Directory to facilitate real-time communication. Unlike email, IM providers
have yet to agree on an open, interoperable protocol that enables all users of
the service to reach one another. But with the high stakes in a battle to "win"
this new network market, AOL has not been eager to share its network
externality with others. AOL claims that its actions reflect legitimate
concerns about privacy and security, but others, including the FCC, have
concluded that AOL is "dragging its feet" to maintain a dominant position
that might suffer in a world where IM was an interoperable service.
Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L.
REV. 822, 831 (2001).
" See generally John R. Williams, Private Frequency Coordination in the Common
Carrier Point-to-Point Microwave Service (OPP Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21,
1986), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp2l.pdf
(studying use of point-to-point microwave links and private land mobile radio
systems).
9 See id. at 1.
96 See id. at 31.
9 Weiser, Network Management, supra note 90, at 22.
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the FCC to define the relevant standard of conduct (here, harmful
interference). In the network management context, as well as in other
Internet policy issues, the SRO would have a role both in defining a
standard of conduct and in adjudicating compliance with it. In reality,
however, the FCC's role in developing the applicable standard of
conduct in the frequency coordination context is somewhat modest
because the close-knit community is generally able to develop and
enforce tractable social norms that limit the need for FCC
involvement.98
For a different type of self-regulation used by the FCC in the
spectrum area, consider the role played by the American Radio Relay
League ("ARRL") in the amateur (or "ham") radio context. In
particular, the ARRL has an understanding with the FCC that it will
manage the enforcement activities related to the use of ham radio.
Within the ARRL, particular individuals are appointed as observers
and, as Hatfield stated, "ITIheir job is to actually monitor the behavior
in the amateur bands and if they see something wrong, they send you
a postcard that says you were observed operating illegally."99 The
ARRL will report only the most egregious cases to the FCC's
Enforcement Bureau.' ° A second form of self-regulation that operates
in this context is that amateur radio operators adhere to a basic social
norm of attempting to minimize interference both among users and
with consumer electronic equipment. 1'
B. The FTC and Self-Regulation
Unlike the FCC, the FTC has considerable experience working with
models of self-regulation. Notably, once the issue of online privacy
emerged as a concern, the FTC responded by urging service providers
to disclose to their customers relevant terms of service that the FTC
could enforce. 02 As part of its effort to address the issue, the FTC
developed an influential annual study that detailed the quantity and
quality of such policies, thereby creating pressure for companies to
98 The reason for this is that the relevant parties are generally engaged in repeat
games. The implications of this point are developed in Philip J. Weiser & Dale
Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 549, 589-91 (2008).
" Weiser, Network Management, supra note 90, at 23.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See generally Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2042-46 (2000) (discussing this initiative).
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follow its exhortation.10 3 As Peter Swire related, the FTC's annual
study demonstrated a remarkable level of compliance with the self-
regulatory initiative - the number of websites with posted privacy
policies rose from 16% to 88% over the course of two years."° At that
same time, Congress focused on the most compelling concern related
to Internet privacy - the use of information that children provided -
and crafted a law to address it.l15
Consistent with its experience in the Internet privacy area, the FTC
is much more comfortable with and inclined to consider the potential
use of self-regulation than the FCC. 11 6 With respect to online
103 See FTC REPORT, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 3-6 (May 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
104 Weiser, Network Management, supra note 90, at 23.
105 In evaluating the relative success of the FTC's and Congress' late 1990s Internet
privacy protection strategies, it is important to appreciate that success cannot be
measured in terms of 100% compliance. Notably, even a comprehensive privacy law
would not be fully enforced, and thus the appropriate question is to what degree does
a particular regulatory regime induce the most substantial and targeted compliance
with the relevant policy goals. There is, on that score, some debate as to whether the
regime of self-regulation overseen by the FTC has addressed privacy concerns
effectively. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy Self Regulation: A Decade of
Disappointment, EPIC.ORG, Mar. 4, 2005, at 4, available at http://epic.org/reports/
decadedisappoint.pdf ("Of the five Fair Information Practices endorsed by the FTC -
notice, choice, access, security, and accountability - only notice can be said to be
present as a result of privacy statements.").
106 Former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky explained the agency's regard for the
use of self-regulation as follows:
From a public policy perspective, self-regulation can offer several advantages
over government regulation or legislation. It often is more prompt, flexible,
and effective than government regulation. Self-regulation can bring the
accumulated judgment and experience of an industry to bear on issues that
are sometimes difficult for the government to define with bright line rules.
Finally, government resources are limited and unlikely to grow in the future.
Thus, many government agencies, like the FTC, have sought to leverage
their limited resources by promoting and encouraging self-regulation.
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at the D.C. Bar Ass'n
Symposium: Self Regulation and Antitrust (Feb. 18, 1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/self4.shtm. Two other commentators offered a
similar analysis:
Self-regulatory arrangements are less formalized than public regulatory
regimes and hence less rigid. Compared to the government, producers
typically command greater knowledge of practices and opportunities for
innovation. Information and implementation costs for the formulation and
interpretation of new rules are therefore lower under self-regulation.
Monitoring and enforcement costs are also reduced under self-regulation, as
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behavioral marketing, the FTC's first instinct was to follow its
precedent used in the Internet privacy realm. Thus, it suggested that
legislation in this area was premature and that self-regulation was an
appropriate initial strategy.10 7 In the context of network neutrality,
former FTC Chairman Deborah Majoras suggested that "self-
regulation by broadband providers could be an effective complement
to FTC enforcement of the consumer protection laws" and encouraged
broadband providers to "consider such a model."'08 This suggestion
flows naturally from the FTC's history of working with self-regulatory
bodies, such as the NAD's policing of false advertising claims.0 9 By
contrast, the FCC has only experimented modestly with self-
regulatory initiatives that it has overseen, such as in the frequency and
ham radio contexts.
C. The FCC and Co-Regulation in the Internet Context
In devising a regime of co-regulation, a critical challenge is the
"chicken-and-egg" question of whether the relevant stakeholders need
first to form the SRO or whether the FCC needs first to call for the
are the costs to the regulated of dealing with regulators.
Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell, Allocating Lawmaking Powers: Self-Regulation vs.
Government Regulation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 520, 525 (2007). The perspective of the
SEC is similar, with its commitment to self-regulation grounded in the (1)
impracticality of extensive SEC regulation; and (2) recognition that businesses enjoy a
greater practical knowledge of their own affairs. See Concept Release Concerning Self-
Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 84 SEC Docket 619, 12, 43 (Nov. 18,
2004).
107 As one report highlighted, Lydia Parnes, the FTC's Director of Consumer
Protection, has called for self-regulation in the area of behavioral advertising, suggesting
that the adoption of any binding regulations in this area would be premature. See Saul
Hansell, The F.T.C.'s Bully Pulpit on Privacy, BITS.BLOGS, July 21, 2008,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/the-ftcs-bully-pulpit-on-privacy/ ("With a
market that is changing as quickly as Internet advertising, there is a danger.., in 'taking
a snapshot of the way the market works at a specific time.'" (quoting Lydia Parnes)); see
also FTC, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/
12/P859900stmt.pdf.
108 Deborah Majoras, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Keynote Address at the
Federal Communications Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, The FTC: Working for
Consumers in the On-Line World 13 (June 27, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf; see also FTC STAFF REPORT,
BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, COMPETITION POLICY 136 (2007) [hereinafter BROADBAND
CONNECTIVITY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf
(recognizing potential for such approach, noting that "the Commission applauds
industry self-regulation").
109 See Edelstein, supra note 86, at 527.
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establishment of such a body. In the past, each model has worked
under different circumstances, with frequency coordinators
developing as an industry body before the FCC formally empowered
them and with certification bodies stepping into the fray once the FCC
called for their involvement to oversee its equipment attachment
rules." A critical difference between those two cases is that in the
latter context, as with many of the Internet policy issues discussed
herein, there were a large number of actors with disparate interests,
which hampered their ability to organize an SRO without government
leadership. Consequently, although the ability to leverage the
accomplishments of an existing SRO would be ideal, the FCC will
likely need to call for the creation of such a body for it to emerge.
In the past, when the FCC has sought to encourage industry
leadership, it has not espoused the model of co-regulation urged here
of explicit adoption of basic norms, recognition of a self-regulatory
strategy, oversight of the self-regulatory effort, and the development of
a parallel adjudicative regime. Rather, the agency has generally
spurrel action (with mixed success) through either implicit or explicit
threats along the lines of "if you don't solve this problem, we will take
action." This strategy, which some call regulation by "raised eyebrow"
and others call "administrative arm twisting," is controversial insofar
as it is runs counter to democratic legitimacy and transparency values
that inhere in official agency action. 1 ' Administrative arm twisting is a
familiar practice at the FCC, however, and was used by the agency
when it wished to see a cooperative arrangement developed for
connecting third-party set-top boxes to television sets used by cable
customers. In that case, agency leaders explicitly told the relevant
industries (the consumer electronics firms and the cable providers) to
reach an agreement or else face FCC regulation, ultimately facilitating
the development of such an arrangement." 2 Despite the success of
administrative arm twisting in the set-top box context, it is a
Ho See Williams, supra note 94, at 1 (discussing frequency coordination); see also
Warren G. Lavey, Telecom Globalization and Deregulation Encounter U.S. National
Security and Labor Concerns, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 121, 143-45 (2007)
(discussing equipment certification regime).
"' See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 873, 875, 877 n.10, 878 n.11. In describing
the practice, former Commissioner Glen Robinson noted that it "convey[s] the sense
of something vaguely illicit insofar as [it relies] on a surreptitious form of influence
that draws its strength from an asymmetrical power relationship between the
government and the citizen." Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An
Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 923 n.85 (1995).
112 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 52, at 403.
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dangerous model in that, if the parties fail to reach an agreement, the
FCC may well lack the institutional capacity to forge one on its
own.
113
Administrative arm twisting as a strategy is qualitatively different
from the co-regulation model urged here because administrative arm
twisting often does not involve official agency action, although agency
officials often use explicit or implicit threats to achieve a desired
outcome. Indeed, former FCC Chairman Michael Powell used this
very tactic in pushing broadband providers to adhere to certain
network neutrality principles." 4 Under a model of co-regulation, by
contrast, the agency self-consciously and formally identifies relevant
norms of cooperation and provides for an institutional strategy to
develop and enforce them.115 In so doing, the agency first engages in a
notice-and-comment rulemaking process both to establish the relevant
administrative structure and empower an SRO to act within that
structure. 116
In short, if the FCC opts to use co-regulation in the Internet context
(or in other contexts, for that matter), it should set up a regulatory
architecture that welcomes the development of a credible and
potentially effective SRO to operate under its oversight. Notably, co-
regulation does not merely involve the development and operation of
an SRO, but, as emphasized below, also relies on public agency
oversight of that SRO and the ability of the agency to act if necessary
to vindicate the relevant principles. Thus, without FCC leadership, it
is unlikely that such an SRO will be established for contexts where a
number of stakeholders with varied interests exist. Furthermore, even
after an SRO is established, its effectiveness is likely to be
compromised without FCC oversight." 7 To provide an example of
113 There is a potentially strong analogy between the FCC's role in this context and
the government's role in facilitating the emergence of patent pools necessary to
facilitate the rise of radio technology and aerospace technology. Both actions emerged
in wartime based on a public necessity, but had the effect of facilitating commercially
valuable cooperation. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 891-94 (1990) (discussing these
cases). I am indebted to Rochelle Dreyfuss for suggesting this analogy.
114 See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the
Industry, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004).
".5 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
117 Ofcom, for example, cites the role of government encouragement as particularly
important, stating:
[Tlhe most likely case [for establishing an SRO] is in response to fear by
industry that government or a regulatory [body] will intervene in the market
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how such an SRO should operate, Part III discusses the FCC's
regulation of network management and how a model of co-regulation
provides an effective institutional solution for the FCC to use in
addressing it.
III. TOWARD A STRATEGY OF CO-REGULATION FOR NETWORK
MANAGEMENT
At this stage in the Internet's evolution, a vibrant debate exists over
how to address a number of policy issues. Notably, two distinct basic
types of challenges must be addressed: how to define the basic
standard of conduct such as "reasonable network management," and
how to determine compliance with that relevant standard of conduct.
In short, the development of an effective Internet policy regime
demands a fair, effective, and legitimate institutional strategy for
addressing both issues.
Both the workload demands and dynamic nature of the Internet
create difficulties for the FCC in providing guidance to affected parties
in matters such as defining reasonable network management. At
present, however, policymakers do not appreciate how the model of
co-regulation offers a promising alternative to the traditional model of
administrative regulation. This Part explains both how the FCC has
addressed the network management issue to date, and how co-
regulation provides an effective policy strategy going forward. In so
doing, this Part also discusses the implementation challenges involved
in such a model and the potential objections to its adoption.
A. The FCC's Regulation of Broadband
By the late 1990s, technological and market conditions had
outpaced the premises that underpinned the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. In particular, policymakers began to realize that the networks
of the future were not designed to deliver "plain old telephone
service," but instead were digital broadband networks capable of
carrying Internet traffic of all kinds (voice, video, pictures, etc.)."
8
place[,] curbing commercial activity and raising costs for companies.
Ofcom's own research has found that most self-regulatory schemes have
been established, at least in part, in response to a perceived threat of state
intervention.
OFCOM, INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF WHEN TO ADOPT SELF- OR CO-REGULATION, supra note
85, § 2.23.
118 In a speech before he assumed the position of Chairman of the FCC, Michael
Powell highlighted this phenomenon and coined the term "the digital broadband
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Thus, the first regulatory policy debate of this new era questioned
whether traditional common carrier concepts - as enshrined in Title
1I of the Communications Act of 1934 - should apply to such
networks.'1 9 The FCC initially deferred addressing the issue, allowing
the Ninth Circuit to decide the matter before it did.'20 Ultimately, the
FCC concluded that Title II (and the traditional common carrier
obligations embodied therein) should not govern such networks. 2'
Rather, the FCC decided to classify cable broadband networks as
"information services" and subject to its "Title I" authority, which
begins from the premise that no regulation is necessary. 122 In 2005, the
Supreme Court affirmed this determination in the National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services case.23
The FCC's regulatory classification decision only begged - and did
not decide - the relevant policy issues. Indeed, proponents of
regulation have increasingly called for scrutiny of how broadband
providers operate their networks, citing the concern that broadband
providers might engage in anticompetitive discrimination absent a
regulatory regime in place to check such conduct.124 In the midc-2000s,
Professor Tim Wu coined a name for the proposed solution to the
concerns of anticompetitive discrimination: "network neutrality."' 25
The concept of network neutrality gained momentum when then-FCC
Chairman Michael Powell later embraced it in a speech as "Internet
migration." See Michael Powell, The Great Digital Broadband Migration, Part II (Dec.
18, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2000/spmkpOO3.html.
"' See AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2000); Brand X
Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
120 See AT&T, 216 F.3d at 873.
121 See Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Inquiry
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002).
122 See id. at 4841, 4847. It later extended the "information services" classification
towards wireline broadband networks (e.g., DSL services). See Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,864 (2005)
[hereinafter Appropriate Framework] (classifying DSL connections as "information
service").
123 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1002-03 (2005) (upholding dassificanon of cable modem service as 'information service").
124 See, e.g., Weiser, Toward a Next Generation, supra note 20, 41-43 (noting that
new model of regulation will need to be developed to oversee broadband platforms);
see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 52, at 421; Farrell & Weiser, supra note
35, at 107.
125 Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 141 (2003).
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Freedom."'126 In articulating what he viewed as the four essential
Internet freedoms - (1) freedom to access content; (2) freedom to
use applications; (3) freedom to attach personal devices; and (4)
freedom to obtain service plan information - Powell also expressly
reserved the right to broadband providers to manage their networks.
1 27
In particular, he recognized "that [network] operators have legitimate
needs to manage their networks and ensure quality experiences, and
reasonable limits sometimes must be placed in service contracts."
128
The status of network neutrality as a policy principle remained
uncertain given the Title I classification of cable modems and the lack
of any established regulations over broadband networks. Nonetheless,
the FCC demonstrated its concern regarding anticompetitive
discrimination by broadband operators when it entered into a consent
decree with Madison River Communications, fining the company and
enjoining its blocking of VoIP traffic.129 Pointing to that case, some
opponents of network neutrality have maintained that no regulatory
action is necessary because the FCC is able to remedy quickly and
effectively anticompetitive conduct by broadband providers. 130 This
claim, however, ignores three important facts: (1) Madison River was
particularly receptive to settling this matter quickly, as it had a
pending initial public offering;13 1 (2) the FCC did not actually conduct
any enforcement process that either found facts or made a binding
legal determination; and (3) the FCC pointed to Title 1I (§ 201) of the
1934 Act (which governed wireline broadband providers until 2005)
as the relevant legal principle that was violated. 132 Consequently, this
precedent does not necessarily establish the view suggested by some
network neutrality opponents that no regulation is necessary. Indeed,
126 See Powell, supra note 114, at 11-12.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 11.
129 See Madison River, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4296, para. 5 (2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A2.pdf (mandating that
"Madison River shall not block ports used for VoIP applications or otherwise prevent
customers from using VoIP applications").
130 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 1, 67
(2005).
131 See Scott Bradner, The Internet: Unblocking Pipes, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 14,
2005, http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2005/031405bradner.html (noting
that "Itihere is no legal finding that blocking VoIP is wrong - that means a better-
funded provider (and one that was not in the middle of an IPO) might just go ahead
and test the precedent").
132 In particular, the agency pointed to § 201(b) of the Communications Act,
which requires the practices of common carriers to be "just and reasonable." See
Madison River, 20 F.C.C.R. at 4296 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000)).
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that case is more open to question in the wake of the FCC's decision
to classify wireline broadband as an "information service" regulated
under Title I of the 1934 Act - as opposed to the Title II classification
that supported the consent decree in the matter of Madison River
Communications. 1
33
The FCC's third major step after Powell's speech and the Madison
River Communications decree was to adopt a policy statement that set
forth a modified version of the four freedoms announced in Powell's
speech. Notably, the policy statement did not seek to regulate
broadband providers per se, but rather constituted a guide for the
agency's "ongoing policymaking activities."1 34 And like Powell's
speech, the Internet Policy Statement made clear that the "principles
we adopt are subject to reasonable network management. ' 131 Given
the relatively concise nature of the statement (as opposed to providing
prescriptive rules), it did not clarify what constitutes "reasonable
network management." Indeed, this term is far from having a clear
definition and merely suggests broadband providers have some right
to control the operations of their network, but what "reasonable"
means in this context remains open to debate.
136
For broadband providers, managing the traffic on their networks
addresses a series of concerns. In particular, broadband providers
employ "network management techniques" 137 to protect customers
from spam and denial-of-service attacks, protect the security of their
133 See Appropriate Framework, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,864 (2005) (classifying DSL
connections as "information service").
134 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, F.C.C.R. 05-151, at 3 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Policy
Statement], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-
151Al.doc. The agency did, however, subsequently ask merging companies to
"voluntarily" agree to be bound by the principles. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. &
MCI, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, F.C.C.R. 05-184, para. 215 (2005),
available at, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-184A1.doc.
115 Policy Statement, F.C.C.R. at 3 n.15.
136 See Matthew Lasar, Comcast, Net Neutrality Advocates Clash at FCC Hearing,
ARTS TECHNICA, Feb. 25, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/02/comcast-
and-net-neutrality-advocates-clash-at-fcc-hearing.ars.
137 To be sure, the term "network management" is not self-evident. See ALEXANDER
CLEMM, NETWORK MANAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS 5 (Cisco Press 2006) ("As is the case
with so many words, network management has many attached meanings."); DOUGLAS
COMER, AUTOMATED NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 26 (Pearson Prentice Hall 2006)
("Unfortunately, network management covers such a broad range of networks and
activities that no short definition can capture the task well."). For purposes of this
Article, I use the term to denote "the activities, methods, procedures, and tools that
pertain to the operation, administration, maintenance, and provisioning of networked
systems." CLEMM, supra, at 44.
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networks, avoid network congestion, and ensure QoS, among other
goals.' 38 Consequently, the reasonableness of a network management
strategy may well depend on its particular objective - say, addressing
congestion concerns as opposed to restricting access to child
pornography. 39
In the case of Comcast's network management strategies, the
company took a particularly aggressive approach to conserving
bandwidth by limiting uploads using P2P applications."4 The public
learned of Comcast's activities when the Associated Press reported
difficulties in using BitTorrent to upload a copy of the King James
Bible from a single PC equipped with a Comcast cable modem.141 After
the Electronic Frontier Foundation further investigated the matter, it
concluded that Comcast was using a technique called "packet forgery"
as a means of causing P2P connections to shut down. 4 2 In response,
Comcast defended its actions as "reasonable network management"
and maintained that the company did not block the use of P2P
applications, but rather delayed P2P uploads based on session limits in
its local service areas.' 43 After a number of groups complained to the
FCC, the agency opened a proceeding to examine Comcast's network
management practices.
138 Ohm, supra note 33, at 1466-67.
139 See id.
140 See Comcast Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028 (2008).
141 See Rob Beschizza, Comcast Again Denies Targeting BitTorrent Following AP
Sting, WIRED, Oct. 20, 2007, http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2007/10/comcast-
blockin/.
142 PETER ECKERSLEY ET AL., PACKET FORGERY BY ISPs: A REPORT ON THE COMCAST
AFFAIR 1 (2007), available at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-comcastreport2.pdf.
143 See Grant Gross, EFF: Comcast Continues to Block P-to-P, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
2007, at Al (reporting on Comcast's response). In response, EFF suggested that the
claim that Comcast's network management techniques did not block packets is "only
true under special conditions, and is certainly not true in general." ECKERSLEY ET AL.,
supra note 142, at 5. In support of Comcast, another commentator explained:
We can think of [Comcast's restrictions on peer-to-peer traffic] as a freeway
onramp that has lights on it to rate limit the number of cars that may enter a
freeway. Those lights aren't there to say people of a certain race can pass
through or people of a certain race must wait longer in line; everyone must
wait their turn. If you didn't have the lights and everyone tries to pile on to
the freeway at the same time, everyone ends up with worse traffic. Comcast
doesn't block you from using BitTorrent, it simply limits the number of
simultaneous uploads you can perform at once.
George Ou, A Rational Debate on Comcast Traffic Management, ZDNET, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=852&page=2.
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In August 2008, the FCC concluded that Comcast's choice of
techniques was not reasonable because "Comcast's network
management practices discriminate among applications rather than
treating all equally and are inconsistent with the concept of an open
and accessible Internet."'" The FCC's decision highlighted that
Comcast's network management practices were not transparent and, in
its view, completely deceptive. 145 Notably, Comcast did not disclose
that it subjected P2P applications to any Internet management
techniques, but simply warned consumers against "excess" uses of
bandwidth. 146
The FCC's decision in the Comcast case represents the beginning of
what is likely to be a challenging effort to define "reasonable network
management" and then structure a regulatory regime to enforce that
definition. To be sure, policymakers often use network neutrality to
connote a number of different issues, but the network management
concern adjudicated in the Comcast case is now squarely up for
debate. In its decision in the Comcast case, the FCC offered mixed
signals as to how it would define reasonable network management,
suggesting that Comcast's failing was that it engaged in discriminatory
conduct and used deep packet inspection, which it labeled as
unacceptable behavior.'47 At the same time, the FCC concluded that
Comcast's network management techniques were unreasonable
144 Press Release, FCC, Commission Orders Comcast to End Discriminatory
Network Management Practices 2 (Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-284286A1 .pdf.
14' The FCC's order excoriated Comcast on that score. See Comcast Decision, 23
F.C.C.R. at paras. 7-9.
416 See Drew Clark, Comcast and Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information,
DREWCLARK.COM, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.drewclark.com/comcast-and-freedom-to-
obtain-service-plan-information; see also Comcast Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. at para. 53
("Comcast's claim that it has always disclosed its network management practices to its
customers is simply untrue.").
147 The FCC elaborated on this point, explaining:
While Comcast claimed that it was motivated by a desire to combat network
congestion, the Commission concluded that the company's practices are ill-
tailored to serve that goal for many reasons: they affect customers who are
using little bandwidth simply because they are using a disfavored
application; they are not employed only during times of the day when
congestion is prevalent; the company's equipment does not target only those
neighborhoods suffering from congestion; and a customer may use an
extraordinary amount of bandwidth during periods of network congestion
and will be totally unaffected so long as he does not utilize an application
disfavored by Comcast.
Press Release, supra note 144, at 2.
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because they were "not minimally intrusive" and seemed to condone
the use of network management techniques - including, presumably,
deep packet inspection - when used to block "unlawful content such
as child pornography or pirated music or video."'48 Moreover, the FCC
claimed that it tailored its analysis "to the particulars of the dispute at
issue" and did not call for "broad, prophylactic rules." 4 9 Nonetheless,
as Commissioner McDowell stated in his dissent, the Comcast
decision "generate s] more questions than it" answers.15 After all, it is
far from clear which network management techniques are "minimally
invasive ' 15 or "reflect a tight fit between its chosen practices and a
significant goal."' 52
The FCC's Comcast Order is vulnerable on two grounds. First, on
the procedural front, the FCC's proceeding lacked most - if not all -
of the characteristics associated with traditional fact-finding.
Highlighting this very point, Commissioner McDowell criticized the
FCC's institutional processes, suggesting that "[t]he truth is, the FCC
does not know what Comcast did or did not do."'53  This
characterization is compelling given that the FCC did not receive any
evidence under oath, held no cross-examination, and merely evaluated
filings where parties advanced self-serving claims.'54 In short, the
process used by the FCC in the Comcast case lends itself more to
political bargaining than judicial-like dispute resolution because it
invites self-serving claims and lobbying as opposed to the
development of a factual record based on the adversarial process.
155
Second, on the legal front, the FCC's determination that Comcast
violated its Internet Policy Statement is vulnerable because the agency
148 Id. at 2-3.
"I Comcast Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. at para. 36. The opinion also stated that it did not
institute "an inflexible framework micromanaging providers' network management
practices." Id. at para. 50.
150 McDowell Dissent, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,094 (2008).
151 Comcast Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. at para. 42.
152 Id. at para. 47.
153 McDowell Dissent, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13,091.
"I See Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 31, 33, on
file with author) [hereinafter Weiser, Institutional Design] (detailing manner in which
FCC operates).
15' Highlighting this fact, some commentators criticized the level of discourse
during the proceeding. Ed Felten, for example, highlighted that, in seeking to defend
its network management techniques before the FCC, Comcast invoked
Congresswoman Mary Bono as an expert and, in so doing, incorrectly stated how P2P
technology operates. Ed Felten, Comcast's Disappointing Defense, FREEDOM TO TINKER,
Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1256.
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enforced a policy statement that did not emerge from notice-and-
comment rulemaking or explicitly warn parties that it would be
enforced." 6 The agency is free to act by adjudication rather than
rulemaking, but adjudications generally must develop and enforce
previously announced principles or rules, as the Madison River
Communications decision did with § 201(b) of the 1934 Act.'57 To that
end, Justice Scalia has explained that "[a]djudication deals with what
the law was; rulemaking deals with what the law will be."' Moreover,
whether the Title I classification itself is antithetical to imposing
regulations on network management is open to debate. 159 In any event,
regardless of whether a court remands the case to the FCC, the agency
will have the opportunity - and, indeed, the imperative - of
156 Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 407 (2007) (noting that "agency cannot base an enforcement
action solely on a regulated entity's noncompliance with a guidance document"); see
also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The agency caunot apply
or rely on [a non-binding policy statement] as law because a general statement of
policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy."); Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like -
Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1328-29
(1992); Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41
DUKE L.J. 1497, 1498-99 (1992). Indeed, Chairman Martin had earlier suggested that
the policy statement was unenforceable. See News Release of Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman, FCC, Comments on Commission Policy Statement, (Aug. 5, 2005),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf
("While policy statements do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents,
today's statement does reflect core beliefs that each member of this Commission holds
regarding how broadband Internet access should function."). Had the Policy
Statement been presented as setting forth binding and to-be-enforced rules (or
principles), it would have been subject to judicial review at that time. See, e.g., Gen.
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
157 The reason for requiring a previously announced rule or statutory standard is
that it affords those affected by the regulation some right to challenge it. See
Mendelson, supra note 156, at 421 ("[Wlhen an agency enunciates its approach to
enforcing regulatory standards in a guidance rather than a rule, it will likely deny a
regulatory beneficiary the opportunity for review that is eventually afforded to a
regulated entity."). Consequently, even if the Internet Policy Statement would be
considered sufficiently binding as to be enforced by the FCC, the lack of an
opportunity for parties to comment on the Policy Statement before it went into effect
is a potential basis for resisting its applicability in the Comcast case. See McLouth
Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320-23 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
158 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 221 (1988).
159 For a version of this debate, compare Weiser, Toward a Next Generation, supra
note 20, at 51-54 (arguing that FCC can use its Title I authority to regulate broadband
networks) with James B. Speta, FCC Authority To Regulate the Internet: Creating It and
Limiting It, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15 (2003) (arguing that FCC lacks any such authority).
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developing an institutional strategy for addressing reasonable network
management and other Internet policy disputes. The next subpart
explains how a model of co-regulation would operate in the network
management context.
B. Co-Regulation as Applied to Network Management
Of the most promising policy strategies available to address Internet
policy issues in general and network management in particular, the
strategy of using co-regulation is relatively undeveloped. To explain
how such a model would work, this subpart evaluates how a co-
regulatory strategy built around a new SRO would address the
network management issue, as well as other Internet policy issues. In
short, the effectiveness of this strategy will depend on the
identification or development of an SRO that is independent, engages
the affected stakeholders, implements norms adopted by a public
authority, and is backed by a credible threat of public enforcement.
A fundamental challenge for any newly chartered SRO is whether it
will be viewed as legitimate. Five strategies can help overcome this
challenge. First, any newly chartered SRO must be subject to
government oversight. In the self-regulatory models discussed in Part
II, for example, this type of relationship was both standard and
important. 60 Second, the SRO must cooperate and be compatible with
the existing institutional environment. In particular, as to the Internet
context, the SRO will have to cooperate with established institutions
like the IETF.161 Third, the SRO must draw upon the expertise and
knowledge in the Internet community, possibly by developing a
Technical Advisory Council, so that it is able to render credible
judgments. Fourth, the SRO must build up its legitimacy by operating
in a transparent, effective, timely, and fair manner. Finally, once it is
established, the SRO must be successful in its assigned mission from
the outset - lest it fail to build the necessary respect and confidence
among the key stakeholders.
The goals of a newly created SRO in an initial charter would be to
oversee and help develop how network management practices would
evolve, how broadband networks would provide access to application
developers (i.e., interface standards and design rules), and how
applications developers would be expected to use broadband
connectivity. To do so, the SRO would need to establish enforceable
standards of conduct providing broadband operators, applications
160 See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
161 For a discussion of the IETF, see supra Part I.A.
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developers, and end users with a sustainable basis for understanding
how broadband networks would operate and cooperate with Internet
applications and end users. Developing such standards, however,
would require a high level of information sharing and cooperation
among its participants involving considerable effort, and may well be
difficult to achieve among parties with different parochial objectives.
162
Assuming the SRO could address these challenges, the development
process could play an invaluable role in providing parties with "a
continuous iterative interpretive loop designed to assure coincidence
between stated norms and evolving practices." 
163
The ability of the SRO to develop standards of conduct for
broadband providers and broadband connectivity expectations for
applications developers would initially lift the burden from the FCC to
define and update what constitutes "reasonable network
management." To be sure, the FCC would need to initiate the process
and continue acting as a norm entrepreneur by actively developing
principles to guide industry action and periodically updating its
Internet policy principles through rulemaking. This process, however,
would necessarily and self-consciously establish broader principles
(such as limiting network management techniques to reasonable
approaches), leaving the SRO in the first instance (or, as discussed in
Part IV, agency adjudication) to specify the relevant standards of
conduct that would implement the relevant norm.16
In the parlance of industrial strategy, the SRO would oversee
standards of conduct that specify how broadband platforms could
evolve in a manner that keeps the interfaces and design rules stable.165
162 See Jane Svetiev, Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 593, 652 (2007) ("In setting interface standards and design rules, [SROs]
must obtain information from their members, but they do not necessarily have the
mechanisms to align the individual interests of the members either with the interests
of the collective or the public interest."). See generally Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking
Truth for Power: Information Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV.
277, 277-80 (2004) (discussing how oversight bodies should evaluate opportunities to
gather such information).
163 Janet Koren Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking Through a Pluralist Lens: The ICC
Banking Commission and the Transnational Regulation of Letters of Credit, 57 EMORY L.J.
1147, 1151 (2008).
'6 This model is consistent with how the FCC operates in a number of other
contexts. See Stacy Baird, The Government at the Standards Bazaar, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 35, 92 (2007) (listing examples of E-911, Emergency Alert System, and broadcast
flag).
1615 See Carliss Y. Baldwin & C. Jason Woodard, The Architectures of Platforms: A
Unified View 17 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 09-034, 2008), available at
http//papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=1265155 ("Even core components
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As compared to an FCC effort to oversee the relevant technical
specifications itself, an SRO-managed process would have the
advantage of being more flexible, sensitive to the relevant technical
considerations, and able to adapt to change. 6 6 Moreover, the
administrative burden of developing the resources necessary to
oversee and adjudicate all Internet policy disputes would shift from
the FCC to the SRO. Finally, even if it relied on the SRO, the FCC
would retain its authority in this area and, if it disagreed with any of
the standards of conduct developed by the SRO, it would be free to
conclude so and either remand the relevant issue back to the SRO or
address the matter directly.
Finally, the agreement of the relevant parties to adjudicate claims
that broadband providers failed to comply with the relevant conduct
standards should be included as an SRO responsibility in its charter.
The FCC could also act as an adjudicator of competing factual claims,
but, in practice, its capabilities to do so are underdeveloped. In the
FCC's Comcast decision, for example, the agency conducted the
proceeding by using a "paper record" and had only a limited means of
evaluating competing claims.'67 By contrast, an arbitration type
mechanism used by the SRO could act under specified time periods
with technically knowledgeable, independent, and non-political
decision-makers. In contrast to the FCC, such individuals would be
relatively insulated from political pressures and could focus on
ascertaining the relevant factual issues through an effective
adjudicative process. 6 ' As explained in Part IV, the FCC could
[of platform architectures] can evolve - only the interfaces need to be stable.").
166 For examples of the concerns raised about government standard-setting, see
Baird, supra note 164, at 35 ("[Tihe risk of government failure is significant, and
indeed greatest where the market is young and dynamic, as is the case with regard to
the current market affected by information technology standards."); see also
Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R.
14,775, 14781 para. 15 (June 24, 1998) (noting government regulation of standards
most perilous when "consumer demands, business plans, and technologies remain
unknown, uninformed or incomplete"); STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 131-55 (1982) (noting hazards posed by command-and-control standard-
setting efforts that, at least in some cases, produce "scientifically irrational
distinctions").
167 For a discussion of the FCC's conduct in this manner, see Weiser, Institutional
Design, supra note 154, at 33.
16 See OFCOM, INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF WHEN TO ADOPT SELF- OR CO-REGULATION,
supra note 85, § 4.3(g) (noting that "[ilt is desirable for there to be a genuinely
independent appeals mechanism that can ensure that complaints are resolved quickly
and effectively, and their outcome disclosed").
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theoretically, and should, commit to operate in this fashion, but has
thus far failed to do SO.
169
Taken together, the two principal responsibilities of a newly
chartered SRO - to establish standards of conduct and adjudicate
disputes about compliance with the relevant standards - would
provide a framework for providing guidance to key stakeholders as to
what forms of network management are reasonable. Unlike a
framework implemented by the FCC under its usual model of
regulation, a model of co-regulation would allow for greater levels of
flexibility and adaptability. Because the empowered SRO would
operate as a collaborative effort among relevant stakeholders, it would
also have the opportunity to follow the cooperative spirit that has
traditionally prevailed in Internet standard-setting bodies. In this
respect, the SRO could adopt a true "problem solving ethos" - like
the self-regulatory efforts in the ham radio and frequency coordinator
contexts - rather than the more self-serving and politicized advocacy
at the FCC. 7' If the SRO succeeds in this regard, it will not only be
more likely to generate more effective rules, but it will also be more
likely to elicit a greater level of compliance with those rules.' 7 '
The SRO charged with oversight of network management (or other
Internet policy issues) must develop a symbiotic relationship with the
FCC to succeed.172 As noted above in the frequency coordinator
example, it is important that the FCC defers to the judgments of a
well-functioning SRO and not invite the re-litigation of the issues at
the agency level, lest it undermine the SRO's effectiveness.1 73 At the
169 Even as far as using the notice-and-comment procedure, it would be a gross
understatement to say that the agency is a model of how expert agencies should
operate. See, e.g., McDowell Dissent, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,088 (2008)
("Commissioner Tate and I received the current version of the order at 7 p.m. last
night, with about half of its content added or modified. As a result, even after my
office reviewed this new draft into the wee hours of the morning, I can only render a
partial analysis."). For a broader critique of the FCC's operating practices, see
generally Weiser, Institutional Design, supra note 154, at 3-5.
170 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 87 ("[Clooperative open
communication may produce more efficient regulatory outcomes because bad
arguments and bad solutions are less likely to go unchallenged. And genuine
communication means that when challenges are advanced, they are listened to.").
171 See id. at 87-88 ("Conditions of trust and cooperation increase the prospects
that the parties will end up with a commitment to making the agreed upon solution
work." (citing Victor H. Vroom, Industrial Social Psychology, in 5 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 196, 233-37 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., Addison-
Wesley Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 1969))).
172 See supra notes 99-101 (discussing FCC's experience overseeing self-regulatory
bodies in spectrum context).
173 Notably, Professor Bratton suggests that the Financial Accounting Standards
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same time, as the ham radio example demonstrates, the ability of the
FCC to adjudicate disputes effectively may prove critical to
empowering the SRO in the first place.174 After all, if the parties know
that the FCC could not, or will not, effectively adjudicate matters, they
might be less committed to ensuring that the SRO is able and willing
to do so.
17 5
To appreciate the importance of the FCC's role in actual oversight
and enforcement as part of a regime of co-regulation, consider the
recent breakdown in SEC regulation. This example provides a
cautionary tale of how the lack of public oversight can render self-
regulation ineffective. In 2004, the SEC decided to loosen the capital
requirements for investment banks on the theory that the agency
could rely on "the firms' own computer models for determining the
riskiness of investments, essentially outsourcing the job of monitoring
risk to the banks themselves."' 76 In the wake of this decision, however,
the SEC "never took true advantage of that part of the bargain"
because "[t]he supervisory program under [SEC Chairman
Christopher] Cox, who arrived at the agency a year later, was a low
priority."'77 Suggesting that this sort of failing is endemic, SEC
Chairman Cox explained that "[tihe last six months have made it
abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work."
178
Moreover, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt underscored the
importance of public enforcement as part of any self-regulatory regime
Board ("FASB"), which operates under the oversight of the SEC is successful because
its "appointments structure and rules of independence assure that its members pursue
its formal mission rather than constituent or personal interests." William W. Bratton,
Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 35 (2007). Moreover, Bratton highlights, the SEC maintains
effective oversight over FASB because it invests in its own accounting expertise and, as
in the frequency coordinators case, the SEC wields its exercise of formal authority -
the need to certify FASB decisions - carefully, deferring to FASB and only rarely
overruling its decisions. Id.
1741 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing ham radio context).
175 Angela Campbell, for example, has stressed the importance of government
oversight by suggesting: "Where the threat of government regulation receded - as in
the case of the National News Council - self-regulation failed. Further, in cases
where the credible threat of governmental regulation disappeared, so did the
regulation." Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. LJ. 711,
758 (1999); see also Estlund, supra note 82, at 347 ("The limited threat of
enforcement gives regulators little leverage to promote self-regulatory experiments.").
176 Labaton, supra note 83.
177 Id.
178 Id.; see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 19 ("A strategy based totally
on persuasion and self-regulation will be exploited when actors are motivated by
economic rationality.").
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by explaining that "lilt seems to me the enforcement effort in recent
years has fallen short of what one Supreme Court justice once called
the fear of the shotgun behind the door."' 79
In short, the ability of a governmental authority to oversee and
empower a self-regulatory strategy by wielding the shotgun behind the
door will greatly influence both the SRO's legitimacy and its
effectiveness. 180 Ideally, the role of the governmental agency will be to
enlist the SRO to improve the quality of the substantive legal regime
while curbing any potential for SRO "pro-industry bias."'18' Thus, an
essential part of a co-regulation model is that the agency must be able
and willing to step in if the SRO departs from enforcing its
overarching goals (e.g., the Internet Policy Statement) effectively.' 82
179 Labaton, supra note 83; see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 6
("Regulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly when they are perceived as
carrying big sticks."); Wolfgang Schulz & Thorsten Held, Regulated Self-Regulation as
a Form of Modern Government, Study Commissioned by the German Federal
Commissioner for Cultural and Media Affairs B-9 (Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.humanrights.coe.int/Media/documents/interim-report-self-regulation.pdf
("Even representatives of industry bodies confirmed that self-regulation only works if
there is a threat of state intervention, such as in the shape of industry standards in
case of failure of a code or sanctions imposed on enterprises that have infringed a rule
(the so-called 'heavy stick in the background').").
180 See BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY, supra note 108, at 136 (suggesting that "any
program of self-regulation is more effective when complemented by strong
enforcement mechanisms"); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 447, 478 (2000) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999) and ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE
INTERNET IS PUTTING PEOPLE IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999),
and arguing, based on Internet privacy case, that self-regulatory programs only work
when government oversight mechanisms are in place); Bill Ray, Three-Quarters of EU
Radio Equipment is Non-Compliant, REGISTER (UK), July 10, 2008,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/10/eu radio-compliance.testing/; Jodi L. Short
& Michael W. Toffel, The Causes and Consequences of Industry Self-Policing, 15
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Tech. & Operations Mgmt. Unit Research, Working Paper No. 08-
021, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016068 ("[Olur findings support a
regulatory policy that recognizes the ongoing importance of government regulation
and regulators to the success of private-public regulatory partnerships.").
181 See generally Grajzl & Murrell, supra note 106, at 522 (discussing potential
tradeoff between industry bias and effectiveness).
182 In theory, this is the model used by the SEC for how it manages its regulatory
oversight of securities markets - as called for by Congress in the Maloney Act, which
authorized the creation of the National Association of Securities Dealers, a self-
regulatory organization that is now known as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA). See 52 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78o (2000)
and other scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). This model differs from that contemplated
herein not only because of the emphasis on oversight and parallel enforcement, which
are often lacking in securities regulation, but also because of the fact that some self-
regulatory organizations operating under SEC oversight attempt to perform both
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C. Applying Co-Regulation to the Cogent and Comcast Cases
To appreciate how the model of co-regulation operates in practice,
consider how it would apply to the Sprint-Cogent and Comcast-
BitTorrent cases. In the Sprint-Cogent case, the absence of any norms
governing Internet backbone interconnection was an integral part of
why cooperation broke down between the parties. In particular, the
cooperation that is necessary to provide Internet connectivity to
millions of consumers relies on a set of ill-defined contractual
obligations and social norms. For that reason, as Professor Kevin
Werbach has highlighted, the "Internet as we know it is surprisingly
fragile."' 83 Thus, by developing a more well-defined set of norms, the
SRO could provide greater stability and reliability in the Internet
ecosystem.
As explained above, the first step of developing the relevant
standards of conduct begins with FCC leadership in setting the
relevant norms of behavior. In the past, the FCC has sometimes
attempted to avoid setting any rules to govern how Internet providers
should behave because of its concern that the market was moving too
quickly to lend itself to command-and-control regulation. But using a
model of co-regulation offers the FCC an alternative: it can simply use
a rulemaking proceeding to identify a norm at a more general level -
as it did in the case of the Internet policy principles - and allow the
SRO to develop those principles into more meaningful and evolving
standards of conduct. In the case of Internet backbone
interconnection, the norms might include requirements to provide
some level of transparency over the terms of treating a counterpart as a
peer deserving of settlement-free interconnection as opposed to a
customer required to pay for transit. Thus far, the FCC has failed to
identify any relevant norms and the marketplace has also failed to
develop them, leaving providers like Cogent free to engage in strategic
regulatory and market-based activities. This creates a potentially irreconcilable
conflict, leading to calls to separate the two. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen
O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 563, 581-83 (2005); Stephen M.H. Wallman, Competition, Innovation, and
Regulation in the Securities Markets, 53 Bus. LAw. 341, 369-70 (1998). Over the last
several years, this separation has started to take place. See Order Granting Approval of
Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 3, and 5 Thereto and Notice of Filing
and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment Nos. 6 and 8 Relating to the
NYSE's Business Combination With Archipelago Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 53,382, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,251-52 (Mar. 6, 2006).
183 Werbach, supra note 5, at 345.
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behavior and push the envelope on what practices it can claim are
legitimate. 184
As highlighted by the Comcast-BitTorrent case, it remains open to
debate how the FCC will address the need to develop relevant
standards of conduct and adjudicate those standards. In some cases,
those standards will be self-evident and the need for enforcement will
be minimal. In many cases, however, disputes will arise as to whether
a firm complied with the relevant standards.
The Comcast-BitTorrent case pointed out three fundamental flaws
of the FCC's current model. First, as discussed above, the FCC failed
to establish any binding legal rules through rulemaking before taking
its action in that case. Second, in articulating the relevant principle,
the FCC failed to develop more meaningful standards of conduct
based on the relevant norm (here, reasonable network management)
- either by itself or through a reliance on an outside party (such as an
SRO). Consequently, the FCC invited disputes like the one involving
Comcast.
Lastly, the most significant shortcoming of the FCC's process in the
Comcast-BitTorrent case is the agency's lack of developed
adjudication capabilities. Notably, the FCC did not engage in a true
adjudication-like process and instead followed a model that is typical
of its usual notice-and-comment model of rulemaking.8 5 This model,
however, did not afford the FCC an effective opportunity to discern
the relevant facts and expeditiously determine its course of action. By
contrast, an SRO charged with overseeing such dispute resolution
matters from the beginning, with an appeal to the FCC, would lessen
the adjudicative burden placed on the FCC, as well as ensure more
effective decision-making.
The SRO plays a central role in the model of co-regulation, but co-
regulation cannot succeed without effective agency oversight. Most
importantly, the FCC is the body that must initially set the relevant
norm. Moreover, as discussed above and in Part IV, the FCC's ability
to manage adjudications is a necessary part of enabling a co-regulation
strategy to work. After all, without the shotgun behind the door, the
FCC's oversight of the SRO will be ineffective.
D. The Implementation Challenges in Establishing an SRO
Assuming that the relevant actors want to cooperate and charter an
SRO to address the responsibilities outlined above, a fundamental
'8 For a discussion of the issues raised by Cogent, see Wooley, supra note 2.
185 See Weiser, Institutional Design, supra note 154, at 3, 31.
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question will be what form of governance should be established. The
form of governance will need to account for the financial commitment
of different players, but must also maintain legitimacy by ensuring that
those who financially support the organization are not able to control
it. To that end, the SRO should draw the individuals charged with
developing standards of conduct and adjudicating particular matters
from the Internet community at large. Moreover, as is the case with
some respected academics, it is important to select individuals who are
viewed as impartial towards particular companies or industry
segments. '86
Once the relevant players demonstrate the necessary commitment to
establish the SRO and a critical mass of participants has agreed to
participate in and abide by its decisions, the next step will be to gain
the blessing of the FCC. This step would also presumably include
obtaining a business review letter from the Department of Justice to
establish that the SRO's structure does not raise any antitrust
concerns.'87 In particular, the SRO would need to establish its
commitment to transparency, open participation (at least on specified
terms), periodic exit rights for members, and, most importantly, a
showing that its benefits exceed any potential anticompetitive
effects. '88
Over time, as in the frequency coordination and ham radio contexts,
the newly established SRO will be able to develop a culture of its own.
Ideally, this culture will be sensitive to the broad Internet community
and welcome the type of feedback typical of the Internet's user-based
186 As Ofcom put it in discussing the potential benefits of co-regulation:
There is a clear tension between the desirability of autonomous schemes and
the objectives of drawing on the experience, expertise, resources and
engagement of the industry within them. The benefits of self-regulation may
only be realised if the scheme is respected by other stakeholders including
consumer and citizen groups, government and parliamentarians.
Consequently a system involving a mixture of independent lay and industry
members will be appropriate in both the scheme's governing body and
further operating committees.
OFCOM, INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF WHEN TO ADOPT SELF- OR CO-REGULATION, supra note
85, § 4.3(h).
187 To that end, the cooperative effort that set and oversees the DVD standard,
which is accompanied by a patent pool, sought and received the blessing of the Justice
Department. See Letter from JoelJ. Klein to Garrard R. Beeney, supra note 61, at 15.
"' When self-regulatory bodies are created with antitrust concerns in mind,
"antitrust only rarely limits opportunities for genuine self-regulation." Pitofsky, supra
note 106, at 1.
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culture (or wiki-nomics, as it sometimes is called).,l 9 There are, to be
sure, a number of particular strategies that can advance this
overarching goal, including a commitment to seek comment on
proposals for particular standards of conduct and the establishment of
advisory committees of technical authorities.
For the SRO to succeed in the Internet context, it must develop a
reputation for independence and credibility. One important role that it
could play is to foster and validate the trustworthiness of different
Internet actors. The original Internet's open architecture design
presumed that actors would not abuse the rule of open access by
either designing or using applications in a malicious manner.' 90 Over
time, it became clear that this assumption was too generous, and thus
users have looked for forms of protection, including embracing the
built-in protections offered by intermediaries.' 9' As users continue to
look for assurances that broadband providers build in protections and
not take unnecessary steps to undermine open innovation, the SRO
could play a critical role in building trust among affected players by
certifying the conduct of broadband providers and providing guidance
to applications developers. 192 To gain the trust of Internet users, the
SRO would need to ensure that its key decision-makers - say, a
Technical Advisory Council - are perceived as impartial and
knowledgeable.
One challenging question for an SRO chartered to oversee network
management practices is whether to confine membership to
broadband providers or open it up to all players in the Internet
ecosystem. The justification for a narrow definition of membership
rests on the premise that only such a strategy could succeed given that
broader participation might undermine the effectiveness of such a
body. Recall, for example, that the IETF, which has a broad array of
members and operates by consensus, is often unable to resolve issues
in a reasonably expeditious fashion.
The countervailing argument to a focused membership is that any
effort that does not include applications developers and end users
189 See DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGED EVERYTHING 4 (Portfolio 2006).
190 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
191 See generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP
IT (2008) (explaining increased use of "appliance"-like devices that restrict user
control).
192 See David Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and
Applications Design: The Role of Trust 13-16 (2007) (unpublished draft,
Telecommunication Policy Research Conference), available at http://www.tml.tkk.fi/
Opinnot/T- 110.7190/2008/spring/papers/04aClarke-t2t.pdf.
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might be viewed as partial and, therefore, untrustworthy by the
Internet community as a whole. Such challenges might be overcome
by FCC oversight (and the threat of more intrusive regulation if the
SRO-based regime was viewed as ineffective), advisory bodies, or a
process sufficiently open and transparent as to welcome input and
invite confidence. Nonetheless, a narrow membership is risky at best
and likely to undermine the likely chances of the SRO's success.
In order to be most effective, the SRO should not exclude
applications developers and end users as formal participants. To do so
would potentially threaten the credibility of the SRO by violating core
principles of governance that all key stakeholders must be
represented, and that the structure of the body should ensure
independent and fair decision-making.193 After all, ensuring the
independence of those "who oversee the self-regulatory system and
safeguard its integrity" is vital to ensuring a credible and effective
model of governance.194
A final determinant of the SRO's success will be its ability to both
attract and adjudicate effectively complaints that firms have engaged
in unreasonable forms of network management. One promising
strategy to assist the SRO in identifying questionable practices is
empowering users (and applications developers). An example would
be the use of tools that reveal whether users' traffic is subject to being
throttled and engage in the sort of self-policing managed by the
amateur auxiliary service in the ham radio environment. 195 Another
promising strategy is for the SRO to ask firms to certify to their use of
reasonable network management through regular audits, or to subject
themselves to some form of oversight by independent monitors.196
193 See Estlund, supra note 82, at 324 (insisting that any credible self-regulatory
regime must be "the effective participation of the employees whose rights and working
conditions are at stake"). In terms of assuring independence, the SEC has taken the
position that a majority of an SRO's directors must be independent. See Exchange Act
Release No. 50,699, 84 SEC Docket 444, 455 (Nov. 18, 2004). Closer to the FCC, the
effort to delegate oversight authority to Cablelabs over the "open cable initiative" was
criticized on the ground that it gave "a single highly interested industry a dominant
role in the standards-setting process." Baird, supra note 164, at 66. Finally, as Ofcom
has highlighted, building confidence in the part of stakeholders requires "openness
and transparency in operation, and a degree of public accountability in relation to the
scheme's performance." OFCOM, IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE REGULATORY SOLUTIONS:
PRINCIPLES FOR ANALYSING SELF- AND CO-REGULATION, supra note 85, § 4.28.
'4 Estlund, supra note 82, at 324.
195 The Electronic Frontier Foundation also has a tool called the Switzerland
Network Testing Tool, available at http://www.eff.org/testyourisp/switzerland.
196 See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 82, at 386-87 (discussing monitoring function and
its success in New York City Greengrocer Code of Conduct); Ray, supra note 180
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In short, the ultimate effectiveness of the SRO will depend on its
ability to develop an effective model of governance and decision-
making, ensure a broad array of participation, and develop effective
solutions for how to address Internet policy issues. Indeed, regulatory
policy can facilitate this result by encouraging and empowering the
SRO, in addition to creating incentives by subjecting non-participating
firms to alternative forms of oversight. But in the end, the SRO and its
participants will develop the strategies for overseeing bandwidth usage
that will strike applications developers, broadband providers, and end
users as fair, reasonable, and effective. By so doing, it will develop
credibility as a certifier of reasonable behavior that will enhance
consumers' confidence in their Internet Service Provider. 197
E. Addressing Criticisms of Co-Regulation
The model that some call "new governance," which can include
variants of self-regulation, has attracted considerable interest and
some criticism over the last several years.198 In the Internet context,
the most formidable self-regulatory initiative to date - the
development of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN") - has attracted considerable criticism on the
ground that it is neither democratically legitimate nor effective. 99 By
contrast, most observers generally view the IETF as both legitimate
and effective.2 °° Even as to the IETF, however, some have criticized
the delegation of governmental authority to outside bodies as raising
legitimacy and accountability concerns.
(discussing role of certification and auditing regime).
197 See also Online Privacy Alliance, Effective Enforcement of Self Regulation,
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/enforcement.shtml ("Validation by an
independent trusted third party that organizations are engaged in meaningful self-
regulation of online privacy, may be necessary to grow consumer confidence.").
1 8 See Jason M. Solomon, supra note 22, at 823 ("The kinds of regulation
encompassed in the term new governance tend to be less prescriptive, less top-down,
and more focused on learning through monitoring than compliance with fixed
rules."). Others have suggested similar approaches to regulation, offering different
names and the basic "experimentalist" theme. See Qrly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 342, 345-47 (2004) (listing theories).
199 See, e.g., Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000) (criticizing ICANN);
Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE LJ. 187 (2000)
(same).
200 See Froomkin, Critical Theory, supra note 32, at 757, 787.
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Professor Freeman has developed a critique of governmental
reliance on SROs based on accountability concerns, suggesting that
agencies must either set technical standards themselves or rely on
federal advisory committees to do so. 20 1 In so arguing, she suggests
that the procedural requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act ("FACA"), which confer greater legitimacy on standards that SROs
set,2 ° 2 must be followed in all cases. In her view, these requirements,
which mandate a degree of transparency and impose other formalities
on the SRO's operation, can better align a reliance on such bodies with
a commitment to democratic governance.2 3
This approach, however, vests too much authority in the agencies.
Under the co-regulation model, the FCC would be responsible for
overseeing the content and procedure of the SRO to which it would
delegate implementation-type authority and imposing procedural
safeguards upon how the SRO would operate. To insist that the FCC
only draw on the expertise in the private sector through the FACA
process, moreover, would greatly restrict its ability to embrace
regulatory strategies that call upon the private sector's expertise in a
flexible and dynamic manner.204 In particular, the requirements of
FACA can add bureaucratic hurdles to the SRO's modes of operation
and, more significantly, disqualify the use of existing bodies that may
not adhere to its strictures.05
Freeman's critique underscores the importance of agencies ensuring
that an SRO's judgment does not substitute for public oversight of the
policy issue in question and that the public agenda operates in a
transparent manner.20 6 Indeed, as a practical matter, the agency will
need to endorse and enforce the remedy, as well as provide a remedy
should the SRO fail to do so. Moreover, the agency will also need to
settle the relevant policy issues and maintain oversight responsibility
201 See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative
Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813,821-31 (2000).
202 See id. at 830.
203 See id.
204 Notably, the FCC's most significant use of the FACA-process - to establish the
standards used for digital television - involved a 10 year effort and the selection of a
standard widely viewed as inferior to its principal alternative. See NUECHTERLEIN &
WEISER, supra note 52, at 397-98.
205 See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act
and Good Government, 14 YALEJ. ON REG. 451, 493-502 (1997).
206 See Stewart, supra note 73, at 447 (criticizing trend among agencies to "turn to
less formal, less accountable, and more opaque methods of making regulatory
policy").
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by embracing formally (as well as practically) the SRO's decisions. °7
Indeed, this practice also responds to the independent criticism that
relying on a third-party overseer or certifier "creates another layer of
agency problems, a point that accounting debacles in the financial
sector have accentuated.
208
An important lesson from the debacles in the use of self-regulation
in the securities industry is that, standing alone, self-regulation cannot
replace the role of government oversight. Indeed, self-regulatory
approaches are most likely to succeed when there is effective and
knowledgeable government oversight. As Joel Seligman has
emphasized, "[I1ndustry self-regulation subject to SEC supervision
generally has been effective in its major applications when the
Commission has been willing to threaten or actually use its regulatory
authority to create incentives for securities industry self-regulation." 209
Notably, self-regulation as a standalone strategy is often suspect, but
co-regulation, at least for addressing emerging Internet policy
disputes, is a promising regulatory strategy.
The second basic criticism of governmental reliance on SROs is that
this approach is likely to undermine the benefits of private ordering
and create an opportunity for public choice pressures (i.e., rent-
seeking or cartel-forming behavior). If, however, an SRO provides a
forum for broadband providers, applications developers, equipment
vendors, and end users to work together to develop norms for
cooperative behavior, this form of governance may well be disciplined
by the fact that the relevant parties are often engaged in "repeat
games" with one another.21° An SRO operating in this manner would
motivate the FCC to avoid the full relitigation of issues that the SRO
already decided, as full relitigation would not only undermine the
207 Such a commitment may not be sufficient to satisfy Freeman, who argues that
"[diespite the formal overlay of agency authority, private standard-setting should raise
doubts about the legitimacy of the resulting regulations." Freeman, supra note 201, at
828. In any event, her argument that "administrative legitimacy is, at least in part, a
matter of procedural design" must be taken seriously in developing regulatory
institutions. Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60,138 (2000).
208 Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAw & Soc'y REV. 691, 718 (2003).
209 Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-
Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59
Bus. LAW. 1347, 1347 (2004) (emphasis added).
210 See generally Robert T. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643,
1657-77 (1996) (discussing economics behind this argument); Randal C. Picker,
Simple Games in a Complex World, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1255 (1997) (same).
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SRO's effective functioning, but quite probably lead to a worse
outcome. 21' Alternatively, if the SRO is functioning more as a means of
facilitating and enforcing a cartel, government deference to its actions
would constitute "abdication of regulatory authority to the regulated,
the full burgeoning of the interest group state, and the final
confirmation of the 'capture' theory of administrative regulation. , 212
The public choice critique of governmental reliance on self-
regulation certainly suggests caution in empowering and deferring to a
non-governmental body. There are, however, four reasons why the
FCC should still rely on private bodies like SROs to address Internet
policy issues. First, those organizations possess far greater expertise
than that available to the government. Second, the industry
participants in the Internet ecosystem are not uniformly positioned on
the relevant policy issues - unlike, for example, the stance of
industry participants on environmental matters - such that deference
to SROs runs a far less risk of ratifying a cartel-like plan. Third, the
sunshine of government oversight can help ensure that SROs do not
exclude outsiders or innovative approaches. Finally, antitrust
enforcement is an important tool and escape valve that should be used
to prevent standard-setting bodies or SROs from being used to
facilitate cartel-like purposes.213 But the most fundamental safety valve
is that the public agency oversees the SRO and ensures that it is able to
carry out its mission effectively.
211 See Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of
Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1136 (1997) (finding
anectodal support for "public choice theory prediction that there will be a strong
demand for legal rules even where the norms generated by private ordering are
producing enviable results").
212 USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996).
213 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509
(1988) (holding liable standard-setting body for engaging in conduct); Seligman,
supra note 209, at 1369-70 (discussing Nasdaq antitrust action, whereby traders
engaged in collusion that was enforced, and not prevented, by relevant self-regulatory
bodies, nor detected by SEC). Unfortunately, it is far from clear that antitrust law
governs such situations. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276
(2007) (holding that SEC oversight sufficient to displace role of antitrust law); Robert
B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 215, 252 (2004) (arguing that governmental oversight, such as those that take
place in the securities industry, should be sufficient to displace antitrust scrutiny and
prevent anticompetitive conduct).
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IV. THE TRANSITION FROM RULEMAKING TO ADJUDICATION AT THE
FCC
In the context of the Comcast case, the FCC's adjudication involved
a paper record and the functional use of a notice-and-comment
process. Going forward, this Article recommends that the FCC use a
co-regulation strategy where the adjudicatory process is closer to that
of a judicial trial to avoid the limitations of the agency's notice-and-
comment rulemaking process.21 4  Notably, the weak form of
adjudication used in the Comcast case is vulnerable to the criticisms
offered by FCC Commissioner McDowell in his dissent, including his
conclusion that "the evidence in the record is thin and in conflict."
21 5
The salutary aspect of the Comcast decision is that it reminds FCC
officials and observers that the agency can act by adjudication as well
as by rulemaking.2 6 In so doing, the FCC can use its authority to
develop greater specificity as to what broader principles mean. In such
cases, it can also act by imposing, as it did in the Comcast case,
prospective remedies of the "cease-and-desist" variety (as opposed to
monetary penalties).2 17 Going forward, a critical challenge for the FCC
will be to develop a more robust and effective model for conducting
adjudications. Thus, after discussing some of the institutional failings
of the FCC's current adjudication process, this Part explores the
opportunity for the agency to conduct adjudications that are more
effective.
In terms of its institutional structure and personnel, the FCC
employs two full-time administrative law judges ("ALJs") to decide
selected matters and empowers an Enforcement Bureau to decide
complaints brought by companies or members of the public. In
important respects, however, the role of the Enforcement Bureau
214 For a discussion of the flawed nature of the FCC's institutional processes, see
generally Weiser, Institutional Design, supra note 154, at 3.
215 McDowell elaborated on this point, explaining that:
All we have to rely on are the apparently unsigned declarations of three
individuals representing the complainant's view, some press reports, and the
conflicting declaration of a Comcast employee. The rest of the record
consists purely of differing opinions and conjecture.
McDowell Dissent, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,092 (2008).
216 The agency has in fact used this model effectively in the past, most famously in
the Carterfone decision. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone
Service, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420, 425 (1968). However, the agency struggled for almost a
decade to devise and institute a remedy in that case. See Carolina Utils. Comm'n v.
FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1042-44 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
217 See Comcast Decision, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,059-60 (2008).
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effectively eclipses that of the ALJs. Notably, the Enforcement Bureau
generally handles disputes brought to the FCC for resolution, often
deciding such matters either on delegated authority or by providing a
recommended decision for the agency. 218 The Enforcement Bureau
also has the responsibility of investigating complaints that regulated
entities have violated the agency's rules.2 19 In both respects, however,
the Enforcement Bureau is still evolving and has yet to emerge from
the agency's tradition of political negotiations to develop an
independent identity. 220 As for the ALJs, their relevance to the agency's
current operations is quite limited, having decided only three matters
since 2005.221
The limitations of the FCC's Enforcement Bureau are two-fold.
First, the Enforcement Bureau has not developed an independent
mission whereby it can proceed in its adjudicatory or prosecutorial
responsibilities free from political interference. Thus, as discussed and
criticized in the House Commerce Committee majority report on the
FCC's operations, enforcement actions are often treated as political
negotiations and resolved through deals made by the Chairman's
office. 222 The second critical shortcoming of the FCC's Enforcement
Bureau is that it has not developed an effective separation between its
adjudication and prosecutorial functions nor an effective strategy to
ensure that it performs either mission adequately. Not surprisingly,
the agency has failed, according to a General Accountability Office
report, to resolve many of the complaints brought to the Enforcement
Bureau or to explain why it failed to act with respect to those
complaints.223
As an example of the Enforcement Bureau's limits in deciding
matters brought before it, consider the case of the two satellite radio
providers, Sirius Satellite Radio and XM, which were long ago accused
218 For a discussion of the FCC's enforcement apparatus, see generally
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 52, at 455-59.
2 " For a discussion of the Enforcement Bureau's investigative process, see the
Investigations and Hearings Division website, available at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/ihd/.
220 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 52, at 457-58.
221 See generally Office of Administrative Law Judges, http://www.fcc.gov/oalj (last
visited Dec. 19, 2008) (listing ALJ decisions).
222 See COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, DECEPTION AND
DISTRUST: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. MARTIN
18-19, 23-24 (Dec. 2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/
stories/Documents/PDF/Newsroom/fcc%20majority%20staff% 20reportt%20081209.pdf.
223 See GAO, FCC HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM BUT FACES LIMITATIONS, AND ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED
5 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08125.pdf.
20091
University of California, Davis
of violating the terms of their licenses. After five years of these
allegations sitting undecided by the Enforcement Bureau, the FCC
finally concluded, as Commissioner Tate put it, that Sirius Satellite
Radio had "failed to comply - knowingly and repeatedly - with the
specifications for its FM modulators and the terms of its Special
Temporary Authorizations ("STAs")" during that entire time.224 The
most damning fact is not that it took five years for the FCC to reach
this conclusion, but rather, that the only reason it decided the matter
when it did is because the two satellite radio providers were seeking
permission to merge with one another. In short, rather than conduct
any meaningful enforcement investigation and adjudication, the
Enforcement Bureau effectively waited for an opportunity - a merger
between the two firms, as it turned out - to enter into a consent
decree and receive, as a condition of the FCC's merger approval,
"voluntary contributions" of $17,394,375 from XM and $2,200,000
from Sirius.225
The development of an effective system for adjudicating and
enforcing complaints is a critical step for an agency that has
historically relied on ex ante prescriptive regulations.226 Indeed,
without the apparatus to develop an ex post system of adjudicating
complaints of improper conduct, the case for either adopting ex ante
rules or abolishing the agency entirely becomes much stronger.227
After all, where the FCC fails to enforce its rules effectively, it
sometimes ends up compounding the negative consequences by
making accommodations to the parties who violated rules that were
not previously enforced. 228 As a result of the FCC's use of
224 Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 12,301, 12,324 (2008) (statement
of Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate).
225 XM Radio, Inc., 23 F.C.C.R. 12,325, 12,347 (2008) (detailing consent decree
with XM); Sirius, 23 F.C.C.R. at 12,324 (detailing consent decree with Sirius).
226 This benefit applies to a wide variety of FCC regulations. In the case of
spectrum policy, for example, the FCC's legacy orientation means that spectrum
licensees are restricted in how they can use their spectrum so that they avoid even the
theoretically possible creation of interference - as opposed to making a showing that
they created interference in practice. For a discussion of this issue, see Weiser &
Hatfield, supra note 98, at 558-68.
227 Lawrence Lessig has, in fact, called for both. See Future of the Internet, supra
note 27 (calling for ex ante network neutrality regulation); see also Lawrence Lessig,
Reboot the FCC, NEWSWEEK.coM, Dec. 23, 2003, http://www.newsweek.com/id/176809
(calling for abolition of FCC).
228 See, e.g., Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Second Report &
Order & Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 16,807, 16807-09 (2008)
(making accommodations for user of wireless microphones); cf. Posting of Harold
Feld to Wetmachine, We File Wireless Microphone Complaint: Shure Says Breaking Law
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adjudications to make decisions based on an undeveloped factual
record of a particular course of conduct, a more effective system for
adjudicating and enforcing complaints is needed. This system could
both develop effective deterrence against firms that violate its rules
and also ensure - through the development of a recommended
decision by the Enforcement Bureau or an ALJ - a level of
transparency that does not exist under the agency's current operations.
In the Comcast decision, for example, two FCC Commissioners (let
alone the public) did not have the benefit of time to evaluate the
substance of the agency's ultimate findings of fact and legal
conclusions, underscoring the vices of the FCC's traditional model
and the virtues of a more judicial-like model.229
The move to a true adjudication model of decision-making would
mark a break from past FCC practice. Under its traditional notice-and-
comment model of decision-making, including that used in the
Comcast case, the FCC commits the sins highlighted by Judge Posner
in Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC.23 ° As Judge Posner stated in
that case, "[T]he nature of the record compiled in a notice-and-
comment rulemaking proceeding - voluminous, largely self-serving
commentary uncabined by any principles of reliability, let alone by the
rules of evidence - further enlarges the Commission's discretion and
further diminishes the capacity of the reviewing court to question the
Commission's judgment. '23' Because the agency's institutional process
enables it to shape the facts as it sees fit, it is less constrained and,
thus, more vulnerable to making, as Posner put it, "[Ulnprincipled
compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity among contending interest
groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants who have somehow to
be conciliated.
232
To date, neither the courts nor Congress has pressed the FCC (or
other agencies, for that matter) to consider more seriously the promise
of administrative adjudication. Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., the FCC
is authorized to act by adjudication or rulemaking whenever it so
Should Be OK If You Sound Good, http://www.wetmachine.com/totsf/item/1256 (July
16, 2008, 18:53 EST) (discussing use of unauthorized wireless microphones).
229 McDowell Dissent, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,088 (2008) ("Commissioner Tate and
I received the current version of the order at 7 p.m. last night, with about half of its
content added or modified. As a result, even after my office reviewed this new draft
into the wee hours of the morning, I can only render a partial analysis.").
230 Schurz Commc'n, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045, 1057 (7th Cir. 1992)
(overturning financial interest and syndication rules, which restricted major television
networks from entering into market for program production).
231 Id. at 1050.
232 Id.
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chooses, as the agency emphasized in deciding the Comcast case via
adjudication.233 In Chenery, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
agency properly used an adjudication rather than a rulemaking
because doing so allowed the agency to address statutory problems as
they arose.234 This consideration, in addition to the agency's relative
inexperience with an issue, its complexity, and the likelihood of
unforeseen circumstances, could have provided the basis for a judicial
doctrine to evaluate an agency's decision to proceed by rulemaking or
adjudication. 235 The courts have failed to adopt any such doctrine,
however, allowing agencies to proceed by whatever form of
policymaking they choose "for a good reason, a bad reason, or no
detectable reason."
236
For the FCC, the thought of committing to proceed by adjudication
over rulemaking is a tough pill to swallow. As Posner emphasized, a
rulemaking maximizes the agency's flexibility, leaving it free to act on
whatever basis it so chooses and providing discretion that may well
protect it from judicial review.237 In contrast to the "informal
rulemakings" that the FCC often uses, true adjudications are held
before an ALJ, use a trial and investigative staff that is separated from
the FCC (which acts as the ultimate adjudicator), and have far more
procedural requirements associated with them. 38  Notably,
adjudications, like "formal rulemakings," are characterized by a
233 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) ("The choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily
in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."); see also Comcast Decision,
23 F.C.C.R. 13, 028, 13,044 (2008).
234 Chenery, 332 U.S. at 201, 203. The Court noted, moreover, that whether the
decision produced by the adjudication should be given retroactive effect was another
matter. Id.
235 See generally Magill, supra note 81, at 1406-07 (discussing possible doctrine to
govern use of adjudication or rulemaking).
236 Id. at 1415.
237 See Schurz Commc'n, 982 F.2d at 1050.
238 In particular, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) offers agencies very little
guidance on the exact contours of how an informal rulemaking must function. By
contrast, formal rulemakings are sufficiently cumbersome that agencies generally
avoid them. See, e.g, Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and
Drug Administration, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1142 (1972) (noting "wide criticism" of
FDA's experience in two formal rulemakings, which took 10 years from start to
finish). Under § 553 of the APA, agencies can rely on informal rulemakings as long as
they (1) offer parties notice that the agency is considering adopting a particular rule or
a general description of a certain type of rule; (2) provide a chance to comment on the
agency's proposed course of action; and (3) promulgate, at least 30 days before the
rule goes into effect, a "concise general statement" that explains its course of action.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
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reliance on the development of an actual record created through the
submission of evidence and testimony subject to cross-examination. 3 9
Given the additional requirements of acting by adjudication, the FCC
rarely chooses to act in this manner.
The notable benefits of proceeding through the more formal
adjudicatory channel is that it grounds the agency's decision-making
in empirical reality and constrains opportunities for interest group
politics that otherwise thrive in the far less transparent rulemaking
process."4 By grounding its decision-making in the relevant facts
determined ex post and avoiding interest group politics, the FCC can
operate with greater flexibility and use the benefit of deterrence in a
manner that largely does not exist under today's model. After all, if
parties can game the agency enforcement processes and successfully
invest in lobbying, they will do so rather than seriously consider the
possibility that violations of the extant rules and principles will have
consequences down the road.
Unless the FCC develops a credible adjudicative process, its ability
to oversee a co-regulation-based strategy (or any strategy that depends
on data-driven decision-making) will remain greatly compromised. As
highlighted in the securities regulation context, SROs operate most
effectively with the fear of the shotgun outside the door. Without that
threat, parties subject to an SRO are far less likely to consider seriously
the need to follow that body's rulings, and the agency will be less able
to compensate for any failings of the SRO when it acts.
239 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 1.1202(c) (2008).
240 As Professors Benjamin and Rai put it:
[TIhe trial-type context of formal adjudications, with the parties presenting
evidence and rebutting their opponents' evidence and with the hearing
officer's decision based solely on the material presented at the hearing,
alleviates the fear of powerful interests presenting arguments privately to the
decisionmaker and more generally reduces concerns about bias affecting the
agency's decision.
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. LJ. 269, 313 (2007). Similarly, as Steven
Croley explained, ALJs "are almost certainly not subject to the kinds of interest group
pressures operating through the legislative process . . . [as] ALJs enjoy significant
independence, their tenure too is, for practical purposes, often permanent, and their
procedures very much resemble judicial processes." Steven P. Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 144 n.441
(1998).
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CONCLUSION
As this Article goes to press, the FCC is opening a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking that recommends implementing an oversight
regime over network management practice (among other things)
through the use of case-by-case adjudication.241 In this respect, the
agency is proceeding on a path to implement the latter half of the
strategy outlined herein. As Part IV emphasizes, an effective
adjudicative model is critical to the overall strategy insofar as the
shotgun behind the door is indispensible to enabling an SRO to
succeed. It remains to be seen, however, whether the FCC can employ
a successful adjudicative model.
The FCC's use of adjudication as the sole means of overseeing
network management issues (as well as other Internet policy issues)
may well prove to be a risky strategy. The agency should indeed set
broad norms to govern Internet policy, but its ability to develop those
norms - whether through prescriptive regulation or even
adjudication - will be tested if it is not able to rely on mediating
institutions (like an SRO under its oversight).
An essential challenge for the FCC is to focus not merely on the
broad norms that will govern Internet networks, but also to develop its
institutional strategy. Both with respect to the use of adjudication and
co-regulation, there are countless details that can either facilitate or
undermine the success of such strategies. In the past, the FCC has
adhered to a traditional regulatory model that it now realizes is ill-
suited to addressing the challenges of the Internet age. Whether the
FCC can develop new models that will operate effectively may well
determine whether the agency transitions to the Internet age.
Regardless of whether the FCC is abolished (as some commentators
suggest it should be242), some agency will need to assume the mission
of the norm entrepreneurship, public oversight, and regulatory
backstop to guide the way towards facilitating critical cooperation
among Internet networks. 43
241 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet
Broadband Industry Practices, FCC Release No. 09-93, 2009 FCC LEXIS 5421 (Oct. 22,
2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-09-93A1.pdf.
242 See generally HUBER, supra note 18 (calling for abolition of FCC and reliance on
common law courts).
243 See Ahdieh, supra note 213, at 252 (explaining that "a public signal to invest the
necessary resources in a coordinated solution, and structured opportunities to come
together, may suffice to allow private parties to achieve efficient outcomes").
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